

The
Quarterly Journal
of the
Mythic Society

Vol. XXIV.

JULY, 1933

No. 1

IS THE ADVAITA OF ŚANKARA
BUDDHISM IN DISGUISE?

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AN old charge against the Advaita of Śankara is that it is simply Buddhism in disguise. It is, therefore, the duty of sympathetic and impartial scholars and critics to examine the position attacked and reinstate, if possible, the Vedānta of Śankara in its pristine purity. Even scholars like Dāsagupta and Rādhākṛishnan have fallen into the same undesirable groove. The first observes, in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, "I am led to think that Śankara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upaniṣadic notion of the permanence of self superadded." Rādhākṛishnan has followed suit with this statement that, "The Advaita Vedānta philosophy has been very much influenced by the Mādhyamika doctrine." The time, therefore, seems almost ripe when a clear note of warning should be sounded to all sincere students of the Vedānta.

In dealing with this subject, six points are to be taken into consideration :—(1) Was there any Upaniṣadic support

for the Vedānta of Śāṅkara? (2) Was there any tradition or literature in support thereof handed down to Śāṅkara? (3) What original part did Śāṅkara play as compared with his predecessors? (4) Did Advaitic dialectic owe its origin to dissenting and heterodox schools? (5) What are the points of similarity and difference between the Advaita and the two schools of Buddhism, viz., the Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda? (6) Have the Buddhists levelled this charge against Śāṅkara or is there any other interested party that is responsible for it?

Let us take up the first two points. That there was sufficient Upaniṣadic support for the Advaita goes without saying when we examine the passages like नेति नेति, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्, etc. These cannot be explained otherwise; if one has to face philosophical facts squarely and boldly.* All the Upaniṣadic passages can be broadly divided into two lines of thought: some which favour absolutism and others which support pantheism or ideal theism. The first is called the निर्गुणब्रह्मवाद and the other सगुणब्रह्मवाद. The first presupposes absolute unity, while the other is dualistic in outlook and supports unity in diversity. The first, headed by Yājñavalkya and others, was for the select few who took the highest philosophical standpoint; while the other was thought useful for theistic purposes of the masses as a step to the first. The latter deals with objective and relative reality. In the modern methods of research, it is often forgotten that Indian philosophy is wedded to religion. We take them as disconnected dogmas and try to father uncertainty or contradiction on original authors. We forget the grand and graded synthesis which makes room for every one according to one's ability, beginning from a novice to one who has reached the sublime height in religion. Sometimes, we take any one of these views, shorn off from the context or that which has fascination for us and begin to exalt it at the cost of everything else.

* Those who are more interested in this question should read *The Doctrine of Māya*, by P. D. Shastri.

We find the two views in the *Bhagavat Gītā*, the masterpiece in the Purāṇa-Itihāsa literature. The Nirguna Brahma in 12. 3-5, the Māyāvāda in 15. 3, and the Brahma Ātmavāda in 13. 2, 18. 61 are referred to by it. These are unmistakably absolutistic passages and there are many more. But, theism is more outstanding because the passages supporting it outnumber those which favour absolutism. As the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas do not mainly differ from the *Bhagavat Gītā* as far as their philosophical outlook is concerned, it is not necessary to deal with them separately. These works are meant particularly for the masses (स्त्रीशूद्रद्विजबन्धूनाम्). Absolutism as it is not meant for them is not so prominently worked out with clear-cut idealistic or negative phraseology, as is seen in the Upaniṣads like the *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. We come across it in the minor Upaniṣads like the *Maitrāyaṇīya* and *Śvetāśvatara*. The *Sūtasamhitā* and *Śrīmat Bhāgavata* treat it. The former work was the basis for the commentary of Śaṅkara on the *Brahma Sūtras*, according to the tradition prevailing in the South. The following verse refers to it:—

तामष्टादशधा कृत्वा शंकरः सूतसंहिताम् ।

चक्रे शारीरकं भाष्यं सर्वश्रुतिमनोहरम् ॥

Scholars are doubtful about the date of the *Bhāgavata*. But, light comes from an unexpected quarter. The Nāndi Sūtra of the Jains refers to the Purāṇas in general as "Purāṇam". So does the *Anuyogadvāra*. The fourth Chhedā Sūtra actually refers to the number eighteen of the Purāṇas (*Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XXI, 1892, p. 297). These three Sūtras are not later than 454 A.D., because Divardhigani, who redacted the Jain canon, knew them. It seems that the wide popularity of the *Bhāgavata* must have made the Nāndi Sūtra refer to it, particularly side by side with the other Purāṇas. Besides, the two verses (1. 6. 25 ; 1. 8. 52) from it are quoted by Māthar in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārika* (verses, 51, 2 respectively ; Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series No. 296). This Māthar is alluded to by the Nāndi Sūtra. Relying on these two evidences, one cannot accept the argument that many of the

Purāṇas are later than Śāṅkara because he rarely quotes from them. Śāṅkara was mainly concerned with the Śruti. To the Purāṇa-Itihāsa literature he gave secondary importance. On account of this reason, he does not refer to them so often as Rāmānuja and others do. Again, the assertion that the *Bhāgavata* is not quoted by anybody prior to 1100 A.D. does not hold good, because Abhinavagupta (1000 A.D.) mentions it in his *Bhagavat Gītā* commentary (14. 8, Nir. Sāg. Edn. with eight commentaries). Its first Hindi translation by Bhuali appeared in 943 A.D. The *Mahābhārata* in 18. 6. 97 refers to the eighteen Purāṇas. The *Bhāgavata* comes after it, as it says in the introduction. From its own words, therefore, we can say that it cannot be included in the eighteen major Purāṇas or that it, the present edition, is the redacted copy of the original referred to by the major Purāṇas. But, one fact is certain that it has surpassed all the major or minor Purāṇas, as far as its excellence and grandeur are concerned. It seems that the *Bhāgavata* and *Sūta Samhita* were composed in the circles in which philosophical interest was active. It is not, therefore, unnatural if we find many of the negative and idealistic phrases in them.*

The *Vedānta Sūtras*, which wanted to systematise the teaching of the Upaniṣads as understood by almost all the orthodox commentators, could not ignore this two-fold necessity. First, they took their stand on the Brahma Pariṇāmavāda and answered all the other adversaries who followed the different types of Pariṇāmavādas and other theories. Then, they pushed the inquiry a little further and maintained absolutism as the highest truth.

In the *Dharma Sūtras* and *Smṛtis* like those of Āpastamba and Yājñavalkya, we find such passages as the following which are purely Advaitic :—

* As regards the *Bhāgavata*, this point is fully treated by D. K. Shastri (*Purātattva*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1983 V.S.), and Y. V. Kolhalkar in his *Bhāgavatadarśha* in Marāṭhi (pp. 456-460). Mm. Abhyankar Shastri has given all the passages from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* to support the Advaita in his *Advaitāmōḍa* (pp. 152-62 and 130-34 Āṇa, Āsh. San. Series).

स इन्द्रियैर्जगतोऽस्य ज्ञानादन्योऽनन्यस्य ज्ञेयात् ।

आ. ध. सू. 1. 22. 2. 10.

आकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथक् भवेत् ।

तथात्मैको ह्यनेकश्च जलधारेष्विवांशुमान् ।

या. स्मृ. 3. 134.

Jaina sources also furnish some information to the same effect. The *Sūtrakrīlāṅga* (100–300 B.C.) has the following references :—1. 1. 1. 9; 2. 6. 47–48. The first refers to *मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्* and the other raises the objection against One Single Soul that it cannot account for the diversity in the world. The passage 1. 1. 3. 8 of the same is purely theistic, because it refers to Brahma or Prajāpati as the creator. Similarly, the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* of the same period in 8. 3. 607 refers to the Ekavādins, who believe in One Supreme Soul as the first cause and the Anekavādins, who believe in One Supreme Principle manifesting itself in several principles. The *Tatvārthasūtra Tika* by Umāsvatī (78 A.D.) repeats the objection raised by the *Sūtrakrīlāṅga* in 2. 6. 47–48. This occurs in 5. 29, p. 131 of it (Biblo. Indi. Ser.). Siddhasena Divākara, who flourished long before 550 A.D., mentions the Advaita and has culled out passages from the Upaniṣads in his *Dwātrinśat-dwātrinśikā* ch. 9, the *Vedavāda-dwātrinśikā* (Bhāvanagar Edn.). Pūjyapāda (550 A.D.) whom K. B. Pāṭhak assigns to the latter part of the fifth century A.D. refers to the Vedāntins in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*. The allusion which is in his commentary on the *Tatvārthasūtra* runs thus :—

तत्त्वमेकत्वं इति वा सर्वैक्यग्रहणप्रसंगः । पुरुष एव इदं सर्वं इत्यादि कैश्चित्कल्प्यते ।

(ते.सू.स.सि. 1. 2. p. 4). रूपादीनां एकं कारणं अमूर्तम् नित्यं इति केचित्कल्पयन्ति (*ibid.*, 1. 32, p. 77, Kolhāpur Edn.). The annotator says that these are the views of the Vedāntins. This Pūjyapāda in his *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* refers to Shridatta, Yashobhadra, Bhūtibali, Prabhachandra, Siddhasena and Samantabhadra, as his predecessors (*Ind. Ant.*, Octo. 1914). Samantabhadra, according to S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇ (*Indian Logic*), flourished in 600 A.D. But, sufficient reasons are not given there for

this date. This Samantabhadra in his *Āptamīmāṃsa* refers to the Vedānta thus :—

अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते ।

कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात्प्रजायते ॥ 24 ॥

Vidyānanda, while commenting on this, calls this view the Brahminādvaita. We shall refer to him later on. Another commentator Akalankadeva who preceded Kumārila explains the verse, without alluding to any view. But, in his *Tattvārtharājavārtik*, he refers to the Vedānta as :—

ज्ञानादेव मोक्ष इति चेदनवस्थानादुपदेशाभावः—त.रा.वा. 1. 2. 11.

Haribhadrāsūri in his *Shāstravārlāsamuchchaya* (verses 544-45) and *Yōgabindu* (verses 512-22) refers to the Vedānta as the Advaita or Puruṣādvaita. In the commentary on the latter by himself, the criticism runs thus :—

“वेदान्तिकप्रतिपक्षे बद्धमुक्तयोरविशेषात् अनानात्वात् । वान्ध्ययभेदोपवर्णन-
कल्पं ” इत्यनुवर्तते ।

In the former work, he quotes the following verses :—

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः ।

संकीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरभिमन्यते ॥ 544 ॥

तथेदं अमलं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया ।

कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥ 545 ॥

These two verses are quoted by Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasāhasrī* (p. 93, Nir. Sāg. Edn.) and also by Prabhachandra in his *Prameyākāmalamārtāṇḍa* (p. 12, first half, Nir. Sāg. Edn). Kamalaśīla, while criticizing the *Śabdādvaita* of Bhartṛhari in his *Panjika* on *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Gaek. Oric. Seri., Vol. I, p. 72), quotes them. The author of *Vyāsātātparyanirṇaya* ascribes them to Bhartṛhari, the author of *Vākyapadiya* (p. 32, Vāṇi Vilās Edn.). Sureśvara in his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika* (Āna. Āsh. Series, Vol. III, p. 1246, 3. 5) quotes them.

All these are the Jain references, which mention the Vedānta from 400 B.C.—800 A.D. The *Sūtrakritāṅga* gives both absolutism and theism. But all the later authorities generally refer to the first only, as will be seen from the criticism which they advance against it. No theistic or Pāncarātric view is given.

Buddhism also supplies us with similar references. In the *Suttapitaka* of the Hinayāna, the Ātmavāda is condemned as one of the heresies. It cannot be said that the Vedānta was not the victim of these polemics. The authorities have not taken special care to name the followers of the particular view as remarked by Rhys Davids (*American Lectures*, 1896, pp. 31-37). Turning to the Mahāyāna, we come to three books, viz., the *Lankāvatārasūtra*, *Buddhacharita* and *Lalitāvistāra*. The first gives the following references:—

(a) तत्र विकारानित्यता नाम यदुत रूपस्यान्यथाभूतदर्शनं न भूतानां सुवर्ण-संस्थानभूषणविकारदर्शनवत् । न सुवर्ण भावात् विनश्यति किन्तु भूषणसंस्थानविनाशो भवति । Ch. 3, p. 208.

This is nothing but मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्, i.e., the Māyāvāda.

Again, the Parabrahma and Ātmā are alluded to while rejecting the permanent Entity in the lines:—

निष्ठाभावः परं ब्रह्म एतां मात्रां वदाम्यहम् ॥ 26 ॥

प्रज्ञप्तिसत्यतो ह्यात्मा द्रव्यसन्नहि विद्यते ॥ 27 ॥

(Ch. 3, p. 153 ; and Ch. 10, p. 325, vv. 480-81.)

ज्ञानादेव मुक्तिः this view also occurs in Ch. 3, pp. 183-84, v. 68 as ज्ञानेन चान्ये.

(b) प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरकालानुप्रवादाः ।

(Ch. 2, p. 39.)

अणुप्रधानेश्वरप्रजापति प्रभृतयः ।

(Ch. 10, p. 309, v. 345 ; Ch. 3, p. 197, v. 85.)

प्रधानेश्वरपुरुषकालानुप्रत्ययेभ्यः ।

(Ch. 2, p. 103, v. 165.)

Here, Prajāpati or Puruṣa is certainly theistic, because the Sāṅkhya view is referred to as:—

द्विविधः सांख्यवादश्च प्रधानात्परिणामकम् ।

(Ch. 10, v. 803, Bunyiu Nanjio's Edn.)

The *Buddhacharita* of Aśvaghoṣa gives only the absolutistic Vedānta:—

अध्यात्मकुशलेष्वान्यो निवर्त्यात्मानमात्मना ।

किञ्चिन्नास्तीति संपश्यन्नाकिञ्चन्यः इति स्मृतः ॥ 63 ॥

ततो मुञ्जादिषीकेव शकुनिः कञ्जरादिव ।

क्षेत्रज्ञो निस्तृतो देहान्मुक्त इत्यभिधीयते ॥ 64 ॥

एतत्तत्परमं ब्रह्म निर्लिङ्गं ध्रुवमक्षरम् ।

यन्मोक्ष इति तत्त्वज्ञाः कथयन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ 65 ॥

This is the Brahmatmavāda of the Vedānta. In *Lalitā-vistāra* occur both the views:—

(a) ते तत्त्वतोऽर्थरहिताः पुरुषं वदन्ति ।

व्यापिं (व्यापिनं) प्रदेशगतं शाश्वतमाहुरेके ॥ 3 ॥ (Absolutistic.)

(b) नित्यमनित्यमिति चात्मनि संश्रयद्विः ।

मोक्षं च देशगमनस्थितमाश्रयद्विः ॥ 2 ॥ (Theistic.)

(Ch. 21, p. 428, Biblo. Ind. Series, R. L. Mitra's Edn.)

All these three works are roughly assigned to 100 A.D. Āryadeva, the disciple of Nāgārjuna (200 A.D.), refers to the absolutistic Vedānta in his *Chatusśataka* thus:—

आत्मैव यदि निर्वाणं ज्ञानं पूर्णं भवो भवेत् ।

तदभावे हि संसारे भावनाऽपि न विद्यते ॥ 23 ॥

नरेषु दुःखमुक्तेषु परो नाम न विद्यते ।

सर्वथाऽऽत्मक्षयः तेन श्रेयानित्यभिधीयते ॥ 24 ॥

वरं लौकिकमेवेदं परमार्थो न विद्यते ।

लौकिके विद्यते किञ्चित्परमार्थो न विद्यते ॥ 25 ॥

(नित्यार्थप्रतिषेधे, Ch. 9, vv. 201-25.)

सर्वगः केन चिद्दृष्टो (आत्मा) ॥ 18 ॥

(आत्मशक्त्युपायसंदर्शने,

Ch. 10, v. 243, P. L. Vaidya's Edn., Paris.)

Prior to or coeval with the same period, flourished Shattan, the author of *Manimenkalai*. In this work occur the following lines:—

The Brahmvādi told her that the universe is the outcome of one egg brought forth by the Supreme Being Brahma (through Māya).

(Ch. 27, p. 192, Krishnaswami Aiyangar's Edn.)

The translation, as it stands, seems to be faulty. "Through Māya" or some such words should be supplied as we have done; otherwise, the word Parabrahma does not fit in as creation cannot be directly assigned to it according to the Vedāntic view, viz. :—

यस्माद्विद्यदादि विश्वमखिलं जातं च मायामयं ।

From Japan, we get some light on this subject.

“Thus both in name and doctrine the *Intelligence School* of the Chinese approaches most closely to the school of the Vedānta (also called Uttaramimāṃsā) for which the chief authority is Bādarāyaṇa. Its first principle is the *unity of the Self and the Brahma*.”*

During the first half of the eighth century A.D. flourished Shāntarakṣita, the last great Buddhist thinker, who took a review of all the then philosophical schools in India in his *magnum opus* called *Tattvasaṅgraha*. His direct disciple Kamalaśīla expounded his master's principles by writing a voluminous commentary on it. This joint work throws much light on the then philosophical history. In this work is the following reference:—

(a) Theistic:—

अन्य इत्यादिना वेदवादिमतमुपक्षिपति :—

अन्ये त्वीशसधर्माणं पुरुषं लोककारणम् ।

कल्पयन्ति दुराख्यातसिद्धान्तानुगबुद्धयः ॥ 153 ॥

समस्तवस्तुप्रलयेऽपि अलुप्तज्ञानशक्तिमान् ।

ऊर्णनाभ इवांशूनां स हेतुः किल जन्मिनाम् ॥ 154 ॥

(b) Absolutistic:—

अपरेऽद्वैतदर्शनावलंबिनश्चैव निषिद्धाः क्षित्यादिपरिणामरूपनित्यैकज्ञानस्वभाव-
मात्मानं कल्पयन्ति :—

नित्यज्ञानविवर्तोऽयं क्षितितेजो जलाधिकः ।

आत्मा तद्वात्मकश्चेति संगिरन्तेऽपरे पुनः ॥ 328 ॥

अपरे इति औपनिषदिकाः

This is nothing but the Ātmavāda criticized in the Hina-
yāna Suttas.

These are the Buddhist references to the Vedānta from the Mahāyāna school from 100 A.D. to 800 A.D. In the *Lankā-valārasūtra*, the different philosophical schools are thus enumerated:—

सांख्या वैशेषिका नन्ना स्तार्किका ईश्वरोदिताः ।

(Ch. 10, v. 723.)

Again:—

सांख्या वैशेषिका नन्ना विप्राः पाशुपतास्तथा ।

(Ch. 10, v. 627.)

* P. 13, *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, by Sadajiro Sugiura.

In these lines, there are the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, Jainas, or Nagnas and Naiyāyikas (Vipras or Tārīkas) as well as Pāśu-patas (Īśvaroditas). But the Vedānta, as a school, is absent though to its view we have already referred. Similarly, in *Lalitāvistāra* (Ch. 12, p. 179), *Milindapanha* *alias* Bhikshusūtra (about 100 A.D., pp. 3-1, Trenckner's Edn.), the Nāṇḍi Sūtra (p. 4 *supra*), and the Bhagavati Sūtra (400 B.C., Ch. 2. 1), there is no allusion to the Vedānta where it is necessary. Nāgārjuna in his *Mādhyamika Kārika*, *Vigrahavyāvartani* and *Upāyahridaya* is silent on this point. His disciple Āryadeva follows him in his *Śataśāstra* though he gives the view in his *Chatusśataka*. Vasubandhu in his *Abhidammakośa* and *Vijnāptimātratāsiddhi* does not speak anything. His commentator Sthiramati does not throw any light. Chandrakīrti, the commentator of the *Mādhyamika Kārika*, mentions the following teachers:—

जैमिनिकणादकपिलादितीर्थकर

(P. 159, ll. 7-8 ; p. 441, l. 6, Biblo. Budhic. Edn.)

But, Bādarāyaṇa is absent. On account of this want of any allusion to the Vedānta as a school, some scholars jump to the conclusion that it did not exist prior to Śāṅkara. We will deal with this point later on. But it is sufficient here to say that the Vedāntic view can be traced back to the fourth century before Christ both from ~~Buddhist and Jaina sources~~. Even Bādarāyaṇa, supporting the view of Śāṅkara, is shown to be referred to by the Japanese source. If the objection is meant for being driven against the Vedāntins, whose view Bādarāyaṇa does not support as the theists suppose, it is futile. The theists are equally in the same boat because, when there is no reference to Bādarāyaṇa, one cannot say that the theistic Vedānta could have existed. Words like Vedānta, Uttaramimāṃsa, Brahma Sūtras, and Bādarāyaṇa nowhere seem to occur. In that case, the theists and other scholars, who have assigned 200 B.C. as the probable date for the *Vedānta Sūtras*, will have to be rejected. Thus, they will be untrue to their own theories.

The scarcity of allusions to the Vedānta, in some of the works to which they refer, is possibly due to three reasons.

It may be that Ātmavāda, another name for the Māyāvāda, attacked in the Hinayāna suttas was too well known to need any philosophical or sectarian allusion. It was possibly considered to be the highest Upaniṣadic view. The same thing must have been observed in the Mahāyāna which criticized the realists like the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, and Jainas. Again, it may be that Buddhists had a divided house. Some of the Buddhists were busy in explaining their own tenets only as observed by N. Dutt* and by D. T. Suzuki.† The allusion to the Vedānta and other non-Buddhistic schools can be expected in a work like that of Āryadeva or Shāntarākṣhita who, besides explaining their own tenets and attacking one another from among themselves, are equally busy with treating and examining non-Buddhistic systems in detail from their own standpoint. Such a reference to the Vedānta has already been shown. Besides in "The explanation of Nirvāṇa by Hinayāna and heretical schools mentioned in the Lankāvatār Sūtra" of Āryadeva, twenty heretical schools are examined. The *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* by Maitreya-nātha and *Prakaranāryavācchāśāstra* by Asanga refute thirteen and eighteen heretical schools respectively. They are in Chinese. If these schools are identified, it is likely that a reference to the Vedānta might be expected.‡ But from the insufficient material at our disposal, it is not possible to dogmatise over the absence of any allusion to the Vedānta as a school.

To continue the reference to Vedic sources after Yājñavalkya (p. 6), we come to Śabar who, in his commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsa (1.1.5) after examining all the other theories, accepts and establishes the Neti-Neti-Vāda, i.e., Māyāvāda as the highest philosophical view, which is nothing but the Vedānta pure and simple:—

अथाऽपि ब्राह्मणं (वृ. आ. उ., 6. 7.) भवति । अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं-
ज्योतिर्भवति । केन पुनरुपायेनऽयमन्यस्मै कथ्यते इति । तत्रापि उपाये ब्राह्मणं

* *Ind. Hist. Qua.*, Vol. V, p. 814, 1929.

† In his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 94.

‡ *Hinayāna and Mahāyāna* by Kimura, pp. 21-25.

भवति (वृ. आ. उ., 6. 3.) । स एष नेति नेत्यात्मेति होवाच । असौ “ एवं रूपः ” इति न शक्यते निदर्शयितुम् ।

(P. 69, Āna. Āsh. San. Series.)

Śaukara had in his mind this very reference when he referred to Ācārya Śabarasvāmin in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* 3. 3. 53. Similarly, Padmapāda, his direct disciple, in his commentary on the same work observes thus:— तथा च विधिचतुर्मीमांसाभाष्यकारोऽपि उत्सूत्रमेवात्मसिद्धौ पराक्रान्तवान्. There seems to be some difference of opinion about the date of Śabara. Some take him back to 56 B.C., while others bring him down to 500 A.D. Vātsyāyana (100 A.D.), in his commentary on the *Nyāya Sūtras*, has the following remark.— सर्व एकां सदविशेषात् (न्या. सू. भा. 4.2.40). On this Vācaspati says, “ तत्र प्रथमं ब्रह्माद्वैतं उत्थापयति.” By this, he means the Vedānta proper. The Māṭhar Vṛtti on the *Sāṅkhya Kārika* of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa speaks about the Vedānta thus:—

इह केचिदाचार्याः वेदवादिन इति मन्यन्ते । — एकांशं पुरुषः सर्वशरीरेषूपलभ्यते मणिसूत्रवत् । इह रसनायां यावन्तो मणयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वेकमेव सूत्रं प्रवर्तते । एवं मणिभूतेषु शरीरेषु किमेकः सूत्रभूतः परमात्मा । आहोस्वित् जलचन्द्रवत् । पुरुष इति एक एव बहुषु नदीकूपतडागादिष्विवोपलभ्यते इति.” p. 31, का. 17. Again on p. 75, का. 61 he says, “ एवं पुरुषो दृष्टव्यः ”. In both these extracts, the Brahmatmavāda is criticized. Here as well as on p. 4, this Māṭhar is referred to. The present edition of his Vṛtti is alleged by many* to be full of interpolations. But our position is not in the least affected, because we have adduced many other earlier and later evidences to prove our case. Again, the date of the *Bhāgavata* is based on the Nāndi Sūtra because it refers to it. Skāndasvāmin (600-650 A.D.) in his *Nirukta Teeka* refers to both Absolutistic and Theistic Vedānta thus:—

सा च सत्ता कैश्चित्परमात्मत्वेनाध्यवसिता । “ स एष महानात्मा सत्तालक्षणः”, ‘तत्परं ब्रह्म’ इति ब्रह्मवादिभिः । भेदाभेदाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयः ।

(P. 27, Absolutistic.)

ब्रह्म शेषवद्गुणजुःसामलक्षणमपरं जगतः कारणं ।

(P. 73, Theistic. Sarup's Edn., Lahore.)

* J.R.A.S., July 1931, *Māṭhar and Paramārtha*; *Gaudapādā's Bhāṣya and Māṭhar Vṛtti* (Allaha. Uni. Series, Vol. VII, pt. I, pp. 371-432, 1931).

Bhartr̥hari, the author of *Vākyapadiya*, has the following lines in his work:—

यत्र दृष्टा च दृश्यं च दर्शनं चापि कल्पितम् ।

तस्यैवार्थस्य सत्यत्वं आहुः त्रैव्यन्त (वेद+अन्त) वादिनः ॥

This unidentified quotation is from *Vyāsātātparyā Nirṇaya* (p. 30). The date of Bhartr̥hari is about 650 A.D. In the *Harṣacharita*, Bāṇabhaṭṭa (prior to 650 A.D.) says:—

संसारसारत्वकथनकुशलः ब्रह्मवादिनः (Ch. 5, par. 34, p. 101 and) औप-
निषदाः (Ch. 8, par. 5, p. 220, Gajendragadakar's Edn.)

This is nothing but the Māyāvāda of the Upaniṣads.

In *Śukranīti*, occurs the following allusion:—

ब्रह्मैकमाद्वितीयं स्यान्नाना नेहास्ति किञ्चन ।

मायिकं सर्वमज्ञानाद्भाति वेदान्तिनां मतम् ॥ 49 ॥

(Ch. 4, Sect. 3.)

There seems to be some difference of opinion as regards the date of this work. K. P. Jayaswal assigns it to 800 A.D.; while Pradhān takes it back to 400 A.D., i.e., after Kāmandak (350 A.D.), the author of *Nīṭisāra* (*Mod. Rev.* 1916, Vol. I, p. 675). It would not, therefore, be wrong if Śukra were taken to be prior to Śankara. Prabhākara and Kumārila (700-788 A.D.) mention the Vedānta thus:—

इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरास्मस्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।

दृढत्वमेतद्विषयश्च बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥ 148 ॥

(Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*, Ātmavāda.)

By this, he means the above passage of Śabara.

यदि परं ब्रह्मविदामेष निश्चयो यदुपलभ्यते तदसत्यम् । नोपलभ्यते तत्
तत्त्वमिति, नमस्तेभ्यः विदुषां नोत्तरं वाच्यम् ।

(P. 30, Prabhākara's *Bṛihati*. A. S. Bengal Library Manuscript.)

It is generally believed that these two authors had some kind of realistic pluralism in view. But they have formulated it for ritualistic and practical purposes as well as to combat the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and Śūnyavādins. As for the highest philosophical standpoint, they point to the Vedānta. This is clear not only from the passage of *Śloka-vārtika* just now quoted but also from Prabhākara's view referred to by *Nyāyaratnāvalī* (p. 60, Advaitamanjari Series):—

निष्प्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मैवात्मा तथापि कर्मप्रसंगे न तथा वाच्यम् । उक्तं हि कृष्णेन भगवता, “ न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेत् अज्ञानां कर्मसंगिनामिति,” प्रभाकरग्रन्थोक्तेः ।
 . (P. 16, 144 as quoted in “Introduction to Pūrvamīmāṃsa ”.)

As we gathered together all the available Buddhist and Jain references from 400 B.C. to 800 A.D., so have we collected authorities and passages to support our view from the Vedic sources during the same period. It is traditionally believed that Kumārila was the elder contemporary of Śāṅkara, *i.e.* Śāṅkara met Kumārila at the time of the departure of the latter. This is questioned by some scholars, who take Kumārila to the last quarter of 700 A.D. and Śāṅkara to 788 A.D. This was all right before *Tattvasaṅgraha* was not available. There is, therefore, the necessity of revising the old chronology. It is also to be seen how far the traditional contemporaneousness of Kumārila and Śāṅkara is tenable. These questions are not irrelevant to the present subject. We have followed the speculation of modern scholars for what it is worth in all the dates accepted in this essay. Orthodox scholarship is proved to be untrustworthy in this case, while modern scholars agree among themselves to differ even as regards a single point. The question of chronology is, therefore, uncertain. This present attempt will throw some light simply on the relative chronology of Kumārila and Śāṅkara the Vedic leaders, Shāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the champions of flickering Buddhism, as well as Vidyānanda and Haribhadra, the upholders of Jainism. For this purpose, we have put the Jain and Buddhist sources between Yājñavalkya and Śabara, so they can be compared.

From Tibetan sources, it is proved that Shāntarakṣita flourished from 705 to 762 A.D. His *Tattvasaṅgraha* was composed in 743 A.D. (Introduction, p. xxiii, to *Tattvasaṅgraha*.) The Tibetan translation was made by a Kashmirian scholar Guṇakaraśribhadra, who was a contemporary of King Lalitāditya of Kashmir (693-729 A.D. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Logic*, p. 324). Even allowing for the discrepancy of 25 years in this calculation (Introduction to Stein's English Translation of *Rājataranīgi*, p. 66), which some scholars have shown, we

can say that *Tattvasaṅgraha* was ready by 750 A.D. Shāntarakṣita quotes one verse in *Tattvasaṅgraha*, pp. 405-406, of Patrakēshari *alias* Vidyānanda from his *Tattvārthasāloka-vārtika* (p. 205, Nir. Sāg. Edn.). This Vidyānanda refers to the *Brhadāranyakavārtika* of Sureśvara in his *Aṣṭasāhasrī* (p. 161, Nir. Sāg. Edn.). Shāntarakṣita has directed his attacks mainly against Kumārila. K. B. Pāṭhak has proved that Kumārila criticized both Samantabhadra and Akalanka-deva, his commentator.* The Jains say that both Samantabhadra and Siddhasenadivākar flourished in 200 and 400 A.D. respectively. But K. B. Pāṭhak has recently proved that Pūjyapāda's reference to Samantabhadra is an interpolation and that Samantabhadra flourished in the first half of the seventh century.† The Jain view is in R. B. Hirālāl's *Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prākṛit Manuscripts in C.P. and Berar* (Introduction pp. x—xiii). But one fact is certain and enough for our purpose that Samantabhadra and Akalanka preceded Kumārila, who is referred to by Sureśvara in his *Taittirīya Upaniṣad Vārtika*. Pāṭhak brings Shāntarakṣita down to 800 A.D. so that he can assign all these people to the last quarter of that century.‡ But the date of Shāntarakṣita cannot be later than 762 A.D. as stated above and because Haribhadra, who died in 770, refers to Shāntarakṣita.§ Besides, his date is strengthened by the Kashmirian and Tibetan sources. Pāṭhak has neither examined these three sources nor has he advanced serious arguments against them. His theory is, therefore, untenable in the present state of affairs. We have also to reject his other theory, which makes Akalanka the contemporary of Śubhatunga *alias* Krishnarāja I in 750 A.D. as supported by Brahmanemidatta.|| The other tradition, which makes him the contemporary of Dharmakīrti

* *Ninth International Congress of Orientalists*, London, 1892, Vol. I, pp. 212-213.

† *Ann. of the Bhand. Ori. Inst.*, Vol. XI, pp. 149-164, "The Date of Samantabhadra".

‡ *Ann. of the Bhand. Ori. Inst.*, Vol. XIII, Part II, pp. 164-65.

§ *Ann. of the Bhand. Ori. Inst.*, Vol. XII, Part I, pp. 71-84.

|| *Jaina Sāhitya Samśodaka*, Vol. I, No. I, p. 19, etc., "The Date of 'Haribhadrasuri'," by Jinavijaya.

fits in well with the above calculation. His date of Śankara (788 A.D.) is also to be pushed back to 688 A.D. according to the authorities quoted just now. Similarly, we have to reject the theories, which give earlier dates to Śankara; because in his *Upadeśasāhasri* 18. 142 Śankara refers to Dharmakīrti 650 A.D. and Sureśvara actually quotes verses from his work.* *Upadeśasāhasri* is a genuine work of Śankara; because Sureśvara, his direct disciple, quotes verses from it and ascribes it to Śankara in his *Naishkarmyasiddhi*. Dharmakīrti is said to be the contemporary of Kumārila. In this way, the traditional view which makes Śankara to be the contemporary of Kumārila is strengthened. Thus, all these Vaidika, Jaina, and Buddhist authors lived in the last quarter of the seventh century or the first half of the eighth one.* The whole result can be thus shown in the form of a table.

	Dharmakīrti and Akalanka	
	Kumārila, Śankara, Sureśvara.	
	Vidyānanda	
	Shāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla	
	Haribhadrasūri	

As the date of Śankara was oscillating between the two extremes, *viz.*, 688 A.D. and 788 A.D. we had to give the Jaina and Buddhist authors with their works. Now as his date is fixed (688 A.D.—720 A.D.), some of these authors come after him. They, therefore, lose their pre-Śankara historical importance in tracing the history of the Vedānta.

We have been quoting references from various sources to support the Advaitic tradition right up to Śankara. Now it remains to see which independent works there were, *i.e.*, the Advaitic literature prior to Śankara. He refers to many authorities in his works as, “संप्रदायविद्, आचार्य and आगमविद्” and even quotes passages from their works. He accepts the necessity of imparting instruction in this subject traditionally

* *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika*, Ānand. Āsh. San. Series 4. 3. 476, p. 1458.

as an important fact to understand it properly. The passages run thus:—

(1) यैरिमे गुरुभिः पूर्वं पदवाक्य प्रमाणतः ।

व्याख्याताः सर्ववेदान्तास्तान्नित्यं प्रणतोस्म्यहम् ॥

(तै. उ. भा., भूमिका.)

(2) सर्वशास्त्रविदपि असंप्रदायविन्मूर्खवदुपेक्षणीयः । (गी. भा. 13. 2.)

(3) अनुकम्पनीया आगमार्थविच्छिन्न संप्रदायबुद्धयः । (बृ. उ. भा. 2. 1. 20.)

In the first passage, he means to say that all the Upaniṣads were commented upon by his predecessors from his line of thought. In the next two is the necessity for traditional instruction. According to the gloss of Ānandagiri on the works of Śāṅkara, one Dravidācārya is often referred to. In the Māṇḍūkya commentary of Śāṅkara, he is called “आगमविद्” (भा. उ. भा. 2. 32) where the gloss says, “द्रविडाचार्यसंमतिमाह”. In the *Chhāndogya* commentary (Ānand. Āshr. Series, 3. 8. 4, p. 145), he figures as “अत्रोक्तः परिहारः आचार्यैः” where the gloss runs:— विरोधपरिहारं द्रविडाचार्योक्तमुपपादयति. In the introduction to the same work (1. 1. 1, p. 1.), he says “ऋजुविवरणं अल्पग्रन्थं इदमारभ्यते” where the gloss has the following remark:—अयं पाठक्रममाश्रित्य द्रविडं भाष्यं प्रणीतम्. From these two references, it seems that Dravidācārya wrote his voluminous commentary on the Sūtras of Brahmanandi on the *Chhāndogya*. This is clear from *Saṅkshēpaśārīraka*, verses 220-221:—

सर्वं विकारमथ संव्यवहारमात्रं अद्वैतमेव परिरक्षति वाक्यकारः ।

अन्तर्गुणा भगवती परदेवतेति प्रत्यग्गुणेति भगवानपि भाष्यकारः ॥

Here “वाक्यकारः” is Brahmanandi and, “भाष्यकारः” is Dravidācārya, who had his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* as Śāṅkara notes on 2. 1. 20 of the same as:—अत्र संप्रदायविद् आख्ययिकां संप्रचक्षते (Ānand. Āshr. Series, p. 297). The gloss remarks: तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमैक्यपरं तच्छेषः सृष्ट्यादि वाक्यमित्युक्तस्यै द्रविडाचार्य संमतिमाह. That Brahmanandi supports the Vivartavāda or Māyāvāda is clear from the following quotation:—तथा च ब्रह्मनन्दावर्णिताधिकारि-दृश्यपेक्षया षष्ठेऽध्याये (?) विवर्तमेव विदांचकार (*Journal of the Andhra Hist. Res. Society*, Vol. V, Pt. 3, January 1931, p. 190). We are not able to identify this quotation. The above extracts

are sufficient to convince that the “वाक्यकार ब्रह्मनन्दी” and “भाष्यकार द्रविडाचार्य” were completely absolutists. Śāṅkara refers to some of his predecessors in *Upadeśasāhasrī* 19. 28; 17. 2; to his preceptor in 18. 233 and to Gaudapāda in 18. 2. Not only did Śāṅkara expound the *Gaudapāda Kārikā* but referred to its author with great respect while quoting it twice:—तथा च संप्रदायविदो वदन्ति (मा. का. 3. 15 quoted in बृ. सू. भा. 1. 4. 14). Again, अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थं संप्रदायविद्विराचार्यैः (मा. का. 1. 16 quoted in बृ. सू. भा. 2. 1. 9). In his *Upadeśasāhasrī* (17. 71), he refers to it. In the same work (1. 1. 4), Śāṅkara quotes verses from the Sundarpāndya Vārtika on both the Mimāṃsas.* In his commentary on the *Bhagavat Gītā* (13.13) occurs a quotation which is still not identified:—संप्रदायविदां वचनम्:—अध्यारो पापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते इति । Viśvarūpa *alias* Suresvara in his commentary on the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* quotes a verse, which is still not identified:—

तथान्यैरपि :—यथैकस्मिन्घटाकोशे रजोधूमादिभिर्भुते ।

न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते सुखं दुःखं तथात्मनः ॥ 3. 134

This evidence goes to prove that Śāṅkara had a great support and literature which he has followed. He does not take upon himself the responsibility of chalking out a new path. On account of the ravages of time, a few fragments have survived. But they presuppose older authorities for their support and inspiration. From this, we cannot give the credit of innovating or establishing the Advaita system of philosophy either to Gaudapāda or to Śāṅkara. The current can be traced back to many centuries prior to them as shown above. Many of the references, which we have collected, do not state that the Advaita Vedānta is a personal fancy of any teacher. On the other hand, both the Jain and Buddhist authorities are unanimous in not making any personal reference. They refer to it as the ultimate Vedic or Upaniṣadic view. The main outline of the system was already there.

(To be continued.)

* “ Problems of Identity in the Cultural History of Ancient India,” *Jour. of Ori. Res.*, Madras, Vol. I, Pt. I.

IS THE ADVAITA OF ŚĀNKARA BUDDHISM IN DISGUISE ?

BY G. V. BUDHAKAR, B.A. (HONS.)

(Continued from Vol. XXIV, No. 1, p. 18)

Now let us deal with the third question. It is very difficult to point out Śānkara's share separately from that of his predecessors. His mighty genius must have introduced some minor details in giving a realistic and finishing touch to his idealism with sane and convincing refutation of diverse criticism. But that does not affect the main thought in the least. The philosophical struggle of almost all the schools was going on for more than a thousand years at least. Every school was systematising its position against that of its opponents. All of them depended upon their ancient authorities and works. Upaniṣadic absolutism was one of them. It ought to have its ancient parentage, as we have shown above, to maintain its position. To deny this is to set aside the hoary antiquity and historicity of the Upaniṣads and the absolutism that was based on them. This denial of its traditional history will lead to historical suicide.

Thus we come to the fourth question. Did Advaitic dialectic owe its origin to dissenting and heterodox schools? In other words, "Was the Advaita as metaphysically systematised more ancient than Buddhism? Did Gauḍapāda and Śānkara being under the influence of Buddhism—as some would hold—introduce it?" We have already spoken of the existence of the ancient Advaitic literature. We shall now deal with it from a different standpoint and from other sources.

In the Upaniṣads, we find great dialectical discussions. Yājñavalkya, the champion of absolutism, lays down the necessity of dialectic side by side with spiritual discipline and scriptural study:—आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः बृ. आ. उ., 4. 5. 6. The word वाकोवाक्यम् (छां. उ., 7. 1. 2) occurs in this sense. Śānkara understands it as तर्कशास्त्रम्. मीमांसां कृ

is used in the same way. Śankara interprets it as विचारणां कृ (छां. उ., 11. 1). The word तर्क conveys the same meaning (पारस्कर गृ. सू. 2. 6. 5). It occurs again in the Dharma-sūtra of Gautama 8.6, which, according to Bühler, is pre-Buddhistic and the oldest among the Dharma-sūtras. In it the word “ वाको-वाक्य ” occurs along with इतिहासपुराणं and धर्मशास्त्रं. The same work refers to the works and authorities on these subjects. It, therefore, must have known the works on वाकोवाक्य which can guide a student in his philosophical study. The particular quotation is, “ वाको-वाक्येतिहास-पुराण-कुशलः ” गौ. ध. सू. 8. 6. Further in the eleventh chapter there is the word “ आन्वीक्षिकी ” in the sūtra, “ त्रय्यामान्वीक्षिक्यां चाभिर्विनीतः ” गौ. ध. सू. 11. 4. Haradatta and Maskari explain it as न्यायविद्या (logic) or आत्मविद्या (metaphysics). Manu (7. 13) enumerates them separately as “ आन्वीक्षिकी चात्मविद्या ”. Kauṭilya, in his *Arthaśāstra* (Vidyāsamuddesha, ch. 1), first mentions it as a common appellation for all the Vedic schools of philosophy, “ मांख्यं योगो लोकायतं चेति आन्वीक्षिकी ” and then refers to it separately extolling its excellence and utility in life as “ प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानां ”. Both Śukra and Kāmandaka agree in making no difference between metaphysics and dialectic as helpful to one another. The former says, “ आन्वीक्षिक्यां तर्कशास्त्रं वेदान्ताद्यं प्रतिष्ठितम् ” शु. नी. 1. 153; while the latter maintains, “ आन्वीक्षिक्यामात्मविज्ञानम् ” का. नी. सा. 2. 2. Medhātithi, while commenting on the above passage of Manu, follows this double implication of the word. The Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra, which is far removed from the influence of even early Buddhism* speaks of “ न्यायविद् ”. This word refers to those who decided the points on rituals and philosophy “ आध्यात्मिकान्योगाननुतिष्ठेत् न्यायसहितान् ” आ. ध. सू. 1. 22. 1. Here the word न्यायसहितान् is interpreted as उपपत्ति समन्वितान् (*Adhyātmapatala-tikā*, Trivandrum S. Series) which means dialectically. In the two other cases *viz.*:— न्यायवित्समयः 2. 8. 13 and न्यायविद् 2. 14. 13, it speaks of rituals,

* *Ind. Hist. Quart.*, Vol. III, No. 3, 1927, Calcutta, “ Āpastamba and Gautama,” by B. K. Ghosh.

which are the subjects of the *Pūrva-mimāṃsā*. The *Pūrva-mimāṃsā-sūtras* again are famous for their logical accuracy in textual interpretations. From all these references it seems that dialectic was not considered separately from metaphysics. In the *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtras* men well versed in it are called “त्रयीविद्यवृद्धाः”. On the *sūtra* 2. 10. 57, Govindaswāmi has the following remarks:—त्रयी ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतः च यैस्समधिगता ते त्रयीवृद्धाः अप्याचार्याः मुनयः परिव्राजकाः । अन्याश्रम-ग्रहणात् नैष्ठिकतापसयो ग्रहणम् । Here the context as well as the remarks deal with philosophers and not with ritualists. त्रयी is here surely वेदान्त. The *Mahābhārata* enumerates all the Vedic and semi-Vedic systems of philosophy and calls the Vedānta as the Vedas:—

सांख्यं योगः पाञ्चरात्रं वेदाः पाशुपतं तथा ।

ज्ञानान्येतानि राजर्षे विद्धि नानामतानि वै ॥

अपान्तरतमश्चैव वेदाचार्यैः स उच्यते ।

प्राचीनगर्भं तमृषिं प्रवदन्तीह केचन ॥ म. भा., शां. प., अ. 493.

Kauṭilya (300 B.C.) in his *Arthaśāstra* mentions other systems but does not name the Vedānta separately. But the reference to it can be understood from the words, “आन्वीक्षिकी or त्रयी” as shown just now ; because as a system it is not separate. A staunch adherent of the Veda like Chāṇakya would not fail to mean it so. This is clear from his own words:—त्रयीविशेषो ह्यान्वीक्षिकीति कौटिल्यः, कौ. अ. शा. 1. 2. In the *Dharma-Śāstra* of Śāṅkha-Likhita the Vedānta is separately mentioned among other systems:—सांख्ययोगोपनिषद्धर्मशास्त्राध्यायी वेदपरः (p. 32, quo. 199, Kane's edn.). Here the word “उपनिषत्” means the Vedānta because the *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtras* (19. 13) say:—उपनिषदो वेदान्ताः. The *Śāṅkha-Likhita-sūtras* were composed in 200 B.C. Still some scholars will object to the Vedānta being taken as a separate system. The extracts, which we have given, suppose it as a system. Further, if one Puṣpadanta referred to by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* be the same as the author of the *Mahimna-stotra*, he cannot be later than 900 A.D. (p. 426, ch. 5. 2. Vijayanagaram Series). He says, “त्रयी सांख्यं योगः पशुपतिमतं वैष्णवमिति.”

Here the first word stands for the Vedic system of philosophy as it occurs with the other systems. It seems that the word “ त्रयी ” meant not only the theistic but also the absolutistic one, which Śāṅkara represents. The verses quoted by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanasangraha* (p. 173, Āna. Āś. series) as ascribed to “ त्रयीविद्यवृद्धाः ” are purely Advaitic in tone and illustrate the truth of the parable “ व्याघ्रकुलसंवर्धितवार्ता ”. Haradatta on the *Āpastamba-Dharma-sūtra* 1. 22. 2 quotes them. But in both these works they are not traced to their original source. Can they be by Dravidāchārya to whom the parable is ascribed? But as compared with all these authorities the oldest reference to absolutism is found in the Vedānta Sūtras 1. 4. 22. Here Kāśakṛtsna supports that view. His work is mentioned by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* as follows ;

- (1) काशकृत्स्निना प्रोक्ता मीमांसा काशकृत्स्नी ।
- (2) काशकृत्स्नीमधीते काशकृत्स्ना ब्राह्मणी ।

Vol. II, pp. 206, 249, 325, Bombay Sanskrit Series.

This Kāśakṛtsna is a grammarian, a commentator on the Black Yajurveda and one of the Śrauta sūtras of the White Yajurveda. As Patañjali refers to him he cannot be later than 150 B.C. Scholars like Weber and Belvalkar hold that he flourished prior to Pāṇini (p. 19, *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*). Thus he cannot be later than 700 B.C., i.e., even anterior to Buddha. As regards his view in the Br. Sūtras (1.4.22) it must be said that many of the Anti-Māyāvādi commentators, beginning from Bhaṭṭa-Bhāskara who came after Śāṅkara down to Vijñānabhikṣu, frankly admit that he held the same view which Śāṅkara holds. This is again clear from Śāṅkara's remarks on the same. We will come to it later on when we deal with Rāmānuja. The present evidence goes to prove that even prior to Pāṇini or Buddha there was a school of the Vedāntins of the type of Śāṅkara. Along with the theists like Audulomi or Aśmarathya this was also called Upaniṣadic as the Vedānta Sūtras give both. On account of these reasons the older Buddhist and Jain works mentioned above refer to the view but not to the school. The same thing seems to be done by the Vedic works

quoted. Not only this much but even dialectic is understood to be its part and parcel (*Q.J.M.S.*, 1924, p. 197). The *Gautama-Nyāya-Sūtras* deal with logic or dialectic as well as with metaphysics. It is not the only work in its field, for the *Mahābhārata* refers to many such works:—

न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः ।

म. भा., शां. प., अ. 210. श्लो. 22.

This evidence is sufficient to convince any sane man that the dialectic, which goes hand in hand with metaphysics, was developed in the Vedic fold long before the advent of Buddha. This is corroborated by *Maṇimekhalai*, which says that early Buddhists followed the logic and epistemology of Vyāsa, Jaimini and Kṛtakoti. The first two are well-known. The third is the first commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras according to *Prapanchahṛdaya* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series). It was abridged by Upavarṣa. Now there arise chronological difficulties. The dates of the oldest commentators, viz., Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa, are not settled. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Sūtras, is prior to them. Kāśakṛtsna, who preceded all these, cannot be later than 700 B.C. But if it is held that Upavarṣa was the elder contemporary of Pāṇini,* the date 200 B.C. that is assigned by modern scholars for the Vedānta Sūtras will be untenable. To return to our subject we find that the opinion of *Maṇimekhalai* is supported by Haraprasāda Śāstri who holds that all the early Buddhists from Buddha to Vasubandhu were indebted to Akṣhapāda for their instruments of knowledge (quoted in *Maṇimekhalai*, intro. p. 68). Besides the date of *Maṇimekhalai* is prior to Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu, the early Buddhist dialecticians.

This brings us to the fifth question. We may here take a review of Buddhism and its history. When Buddha came to the religio-philosophical arena of his time some of the contending gladiators were indulging in ruthless and destructive logic, and reckless and irresponsible life. It was already an era of intellectual ferment. Sophistry and superstitious vagaries

* 700 B.C., *Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency*, by Bhandārkar, p. 29, year 1883-1884.

were rampant. This state of things we gather from the *Sāmānyaphala* and *Sambhiya* suttas of Buddhism where 62 heresies are referred to. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* of the Jains mentions 364. It was very difficult to raise one's head for any sane view or school against such casuistry. The Vaidiks kept themselves aloof from these environments and left these people to the mercy of time. Buddha got disgusted with this unbridled intellectualism and sensualistic materialism. Through his humanitarian and purely spiritual zeal he refused to discuss his views and even threw overboard the constructive aspect of dialectic and philosophy. On account of his other-worldly and ascetical attitude he disliked any system-building either religious or secular. He brushed aside all the positive ideals in life (अभ्युदय) and emphasized the highest ascetical earnestness (निःश्रेयस) on all alike at the cost of partial and relative truths in religion which are the sole support of the imperfect understanding of the masses. His main mission was to preach, "Come, see, and get out of this wretched world, which is full of misery only." In his earnestness he completely rejected the authority of the Veda or any traditional spiritual experience. In his zeal he condemned the Vedic sages or Ṛṣis, their philosophy and rituals. Under these circumstances it is but natural that he or his followers should not accept the Veda or Upaniṣads as their religious or spiritual guide. Even where they seem to accept they read their ethical earnestness into them. But the context at times does not support them. Such an enthusiastic and one-sided ideal, however suitable it might be for a select few, cannot be welcomed by the diversity of human nature in all countries and in all times. It, therefore, evoked opposition from the Vaidikas, who through their age-long experience were convinced of the fact that the world is meant for a pleasure-seeking worldly man as well as for religious aspirants of different grades. Provision was to be made for all according to their ability so that they can reach the highest ideal slowly and gradually. To the Vaidikas the world was a mixture of pain and pleasure. It was, therefore, wise to make the best

of it without finding any fault with it. It was their experience that mere spiritual experience becomes superstitious and unsound if it is not backed up by sane thought and thorough conviction. To them religion and philosophy was a complete whole. On account of this difference of outlook and attitude towards life and religion Buddha was called a heretic by them. Buddha went so far as to be silent on many serious questions. This silence is construed by modern scholars to be due to his ignorance and prejudice. Such a view is held by the author of "Indian Logic as preserved in China and Japan" p. 29 and supported by Keith and Poussin as quoted in the "Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa" p. 21. While others hold that it was due to his polite indifference or sheer madness for salvation. Whatever that be, one thing is certain and clear that he has not met metaphysicians on their own grounds.* In the case of the Vaidikas reason and ethics went hand in hand; while Buddha exalted the claims of ethics and condemned reason as immoral and futile as if all metaphysicians are necessarily impure or dishonest. On account of his spiritual dynamism he silenced many of his adversaries to submission for the time being. But the moment that mighty figure passed away his followers were divided among themselves. His attitude was curiously understood, variously interpreted and even seriously doubted. As a result of this the whole of his Monastic Order was split up into eighteen different schools. They inherited their master's metaphysical distaste. But when they saw other powerful metaphysical systems in the field they were forced to handle dialectic for negative and destructive purposes to outwit them.† With them it was not the question of making spiritual experience intelligible with the help of sane thought. On account of this and the rejection of the traditional spiritual experience or the Veda all the Buddhist philosophical schools were called heterodox by the Vaidikas. Thus there sprang up different schools in Buddhism.

* A. Coomaraswami's *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, pp. 198, 205,

† *Hinayāna and Mahāyāna*, pp. 21-25, by Kimura.

They had no metaphysical interest.* Thus they reverted to what Buddha avoided and disliked. The first stage, which was formulated by the two schools of Hinayāna, was the primitive and realistic indifferentism with scepticism. The second was developed by the two schools of Mahāyāna. It was idealism and negativism. Its latest systematisers were Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna respectively. For our purpose, we shall deal with the two latter schools alone.

The Vijñānavāda or subjective idealism meant that what we regard as the external or objective world of difference and multiplicity is simply an internal or subjective world of our mental idea having no external objects corresponding to them. The Śūnyavāda or Nihilism meant that the world of external objects is absolutely non-existent like the barren woman's son. From these two views it can be inferred that both the schools tried to explain away the world of external objects and experience as remarked by Sogen Yamakami in his introduction to the *Tathatāvāda of Aśvaghōṣa* (systems of Buddhistic Thought). These two theories were death blows to realism or to any positive system. But against these Śāṅkara says that the world of difference and multiplicity is unreal only from the point of view of the liberated soul, i.e., Muktātmā and not from the standpoint of all embodied souls or human beings. He is neither an epistemological idealist nor nihilist. He has given the realists their due share. He observes, “येन त्वेतेन न विरुध्यते तेनेष्टमेव सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योः सावकाशत्वम्,” ब्र. सू. भा. 2.1.3. Again he makes similar remarks in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* 18, 19. He freely uses the logical terminology of the Naiyāyikas in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. He accepts the realists where they stand; but questions their absolute claims. He pushes the quest a little further and brings out the highest ideal more vividly and clearly. He stops at the ultimate spiritual realization as a true mystic and

* D. T. Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 114-115 and 340; *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 285; *Sākya or Buddhist Origins*, by Rhys Davids, 1931, p. 432.

puts it metaphysically as one Permanent Entity, i.e., “ब्रह्म”. Everything else then, he says, is the result of false vision. His philosophical outlook is well depicted in his life while God is conversing with Śāṅkara in the form of a Chaṇḍāla at Benares. His biographer Vyāsāchala gives it in the following verse :—

देहभावेन तु दासोऽहं जीवबुद्ध्या त्वदंशकः ।

आत्मबुद्ध्या त्वमेवाहं इति मे निश्चला मतिः ॥ १ ॥

In this there are three stages of evolution. The first is realistic pluralism based on common sense experience. The second is dualism and supports unity in diversity from the psychological standpoint. The third and the last is the Absolute where he maintains that “ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या” जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः । The Buddhists from Buddha to Śāntarākṣita were not prepared to accept the permanent self. It is true that they were forced to accept the Tathatā-garbha as a substitute for the self of the Vedāntins. But that was only to attract the attention of the Thirthikas or heretics as remarked by the *Lankāvatāra-sutta*. They are neither serious about it nor are they ready to put it metaphysically. If any such charge is brought against them they openly repudiate it. Depending on this Tathatā Āśvaghoṣa formulated his Tathatāvāda. He arrives at it mystically or psychologically but not metaphysically as the last ontological goal. He does not take the world to be relatively real. This is clear from the following extract from Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*—“by the creation of an external world *which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver*”—Āśvaghoṣa's *Philosophy*, p. 133. The nature of this Tathatā is obscured by Avidyā. This word as well as Māyā are common to this school as well as to the Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda. To all these three it is simply subjective illusion. The question of the relative reality and creation of the world does not appear in these three views. Buddha was unwilling to speak anything about his spiritual experience. But Āśvaghoṣa, partly because of his Brahminical influence, definitely said something about it. In doing this he

was untrue to the distinctive feature of Buddhism that there is nothing permanent. Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna, who came after him, rejected his view and explained the phenomenon as the result of mental illusion only without committing themselves to any permanent entity. Here it is necessary to note that Suzuki in his "Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism," pp. 138—139, compares anyhow the Sāṅkhya psychological categories with those treated in the "Awakening of Faith" of Aśva-ghoṣa. But he has not touched the metaphysical categories, which the Sāṅkhya and Śāṅkara in *Br. Sū. Com.* 2.3.14 accept. The Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta accept both the psychological and metaphysical categories.

Śāṅkara has pointed out the difference between the Vijñānavāda and that of his view. Both Śāṅkara and Śāntaraksita are clear on this point so that there should not be any misunderstanding about their respective theories. The latter distinguishes it from that of the Vedānta (*Taittīyaśāstra*, verse 330). Śāṅkara, whose main interest while interpreting the texts before him was purely metaphysical, could not but do scant courtesy and summarily dismiss the Śūnyavāda as averse to all philosophical systems. From this some think that he was ignorant of or misrepresented the Mādhyamika-kārikas of Nāgārjuna. But against this view goes his examination of "Samvṛti" in the *Chhāndogya* (6. 2. 1-3). In the commentary on the *Bra. Sū.* (2. 2. 32) he confined himself more to the implication of the wording of the sūtra than to interpret it independently. In both these places he maintains that absolute negation is impossible without the assertion of any positive entity as its counterpart; otherwise the negation itself results in doubting the doubter himself. His very existence becomes questionable. As long as any permanent entity is not maintained the world of external objects and experience can never be sublated or denied. When something new is established then alone a pre-existing substance can be denied. But the Śūnyavādins had no philosophical position to stand. They were not prepared to give any metaphysical goal. It is true that they accept some positively mystical

and spiritual end. But that is for ethical purposes only. Theirs is the ethical Absolute. Śankara's Absolute is ethico-metaphysical, *i.e.*, his Brahma and Moksha are one and the same. (ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः । ब्र. सू. भा. 1.1.4, pp. 17-18, Nir. Sāg. Edn. bare text.) Like the Śūnyavāda the Vijñānavāda also shirks the responsibility of explaining the phenomenon and asserts that it is simply the creation of ideas. It is subjective idealism. But the Vedānta is positive both relatively and absolutely; while the other two are evasive, negative and sceptic throughout. This makes a world of difference as far as their philosophical standpoints are concerned. The Vedānta is *absolute idealism*. The following couplet properly gives the difference between both the idealisms:—

विज्ञानवादी क्षणिकत्वमेषामङ्गीचकारापि बहुत्वमेषः ।

वेदान्तवादी स्थिरसंविदेकेत्यङ्गीचकारेति महान् विशेषः ॥

शां. दि. 16. 78.

Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasāhasrī* notes this, “प्रक्रियाभेद” (Nir. Sāg. Edn., p. 163). Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* says that in the Vedānta negation has a positive counterpart whereas there is none in the Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda. This is in the following verse:—

सुगतब्रह्मवादिनो विशेषः यदादिमः ।

सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वं भूते द्वितीयस्तदनन्यताम् ॥

Now there is bound to be some similarity of arguments when both the absolutists and nihilists or idealists are dealing with the ultimate and idealistic problems. But the difference stands more marked as regards their standpoints and ultimate dialectic. Vedāntic dialectic is shown to be prior to Buddha as the *Sāmānyaphala* and *Lankāvalāra suttas* presuppose it. The four-cornered logic as ascribed to Nāgārjuna, can be traced back to Buddha's contemporary sophists like Sanjaya and others. Nāgārjuna and others used their destructive dialectic to demolish all positive and metaphysical conceptions. They were not prepared to give any system. This lack of system and maturity is the central defect of Buddhistic philosophical

schools as remarked by Yoshonitra in his *Abhidhamma-koṣa-vyākhyā*.* “The Buddhists are by no means agreed on a number of disputed philosophical questions.....” Śāṅkara has observed the same thing with distrust and dissatisfaction in his *Br. Sūt. Com.*, 2. 2. 32.

The words “Māyā and Avidyā,” which are common both to the Vedānta and Mahāyāna, have got different meanings in each. In the first they mean illusion without any absolute value. Relatively it is some positive entity depending on the Brahman. It is called, “Prāṇa” in the *Upaniṣads* (प्राणा वै सत्यं, छां. उ. 7. 17. 2 ; उप. साह. 17. 28 ; सुं. उ. 2. 1. 3 ; मां. का. 1. 6 ; प्र. उ. 3. 3 ; क. उ. 6. 2 ; इन्द्रो मायाभिः, बृ. आ. उ. 2. 5. 19 ; विश्वमाया, श्वे. उ. 1. 10 ; मायां तु प्रकृतिं, श्वे. उ. 4. 10 ; मायया सन्निरुद्धः, श्वे. उ. 4. 9). Here all those passages speak of cosmical illusion, which has no absolute value. From this standpoint they say that it does not exist (नेति नेति, बृ. आ. उ. 2. 3. 6 ; 3. 9. 26 ; 4. 5. 15 ; 4. 1. 22 ; 4. 2. 4). This illusion is psychological also (अविद्या, छां. उ. 1. 1. 10 ; बृ. आ. उ. 4. 3. 20 ; 1. 1. 3 ; 1. 4. 10). Later writers restrict “माया” for the first kind of illusion and “अविद्या” for the second. But Śāṅkara has not observed this distinction clearly. He uses both these words promiscuously. Śāṅkara and Gauḍapāda are clear in interpreting the above passages. In the Vedānta, illusion has the double function of obscuring the real nature of the ब्रह्मन् and projecting the phenomenon (विक्षेपशक्तिर्लिङ्गादि-ब्रह्माण्डान्तं जगत्सृजत्). Thus illusion is psychometaphysical, *i.e.*, both subjective and objective ; while in all the three Buddhistic schools it is simply subjective. This important difference between the two implications of Māyā of the Vedāntins and the Buddhists is intentionally or otherwise lost sight of by many. There are other phrases and words, which Gauḍapāda uses in his work. They are alleged to be Buddhistic in origin ; because the works like the *Lankāvatāra sūtra* and *Mādhyamika-Kārikas* use them. That both the Vedāntins and Buddhists use them is not a sufficient proof to

* G. K. Nariman's *Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism*, p. 282.

assert that they were the special property of the Buddhists alone. As we have just now traced the two words to their original source, so can the word “अज्ञातचक्रम्” be found in the *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad* (6. 24), which according to Tilak and others is not later than 1880 B.C. (*Gītā-rahasya* 3rd edn. p. 547). After these Upaniṣads some school like that of Yājñyavalkya or Kāśakṛtsna must have developed them. Śāṅkara and Gauḍapāda, who owed direct allegiance to such a school have freely made use of such ideology and phraseology as seen from the history of the Vedānta, traced above prior to Śāṅkara. The Buddhists like Nāgārjuna and others have used such words and ideas to suit their negative and sceptic purposes. We have shown above that all early Buddhists followed the logic and epistemology of the Vaidikas. The Buddhists, therefore, felt no scruples to use these or similar phrases provided they adhered to their standpoint without committing themselves to any metaphysical position. But one fact is clear that the Vedāntins never lost sight of their absolutism and the Buddhists have ever tried to demolish the Ātmavāda. About these common ideas and phrases scholars like Stecherbatsky (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 51), Poussin (*J.R.A.S.*, 1910, p. 128, Buddhist notes), and Keith (*A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 476) hold the same opinion as we have sketched above. But Jacobi (*J.A.O.S.*, Vol. 33, 1913), Barnett (*J.R.A.S.*, 1910), and Sukthankar (*W.Z.K.M.*, Vol. 22, p. 136) take a different view. They hold that there was an absolute blank between the Upaniṣads and Śāṅkara and that the Advaita came into existence on account of the reaction against the Buddhists during the seventh century A.D. or due to Śāṅkara's being brought up and trained in Buddhist circles. We have given sufficient evidence to prove that such a view is untenable. They opine that the Buddhists introduced this negative phraseology and ideology for the first time. It was exploited by Gauḍapāda and Śāṅkara to make some kind of halting compromise with them. Unless they trace the history of these terms and phrases in non-Buddhist circles they cannot safely dogmatise over this point. We cannot hold Śāṅkara responsible

for misrepresenting the terms while commenting on them. Śāṅkara was forced to interpret as the author meant. He himself observes :—

अतो मिथ्यादर्शनानि तानीति तद्युक्तिभिरेव दर्शयित्वा । मां. का. भा. 4. 87.

तदुपपत्तिभिरेव निराकरणाय चतुर्थं प्रकरणम् । p. 8, Āna. Ās. Series,
मा. का. भा.

That the commentary on the work is from the pen of Śāṅkara is clear. Ānandagiri's gloss while explaining the second, introductory verse presupposes three glosses, which commented upon the commentary of Śāṅkara. Ānandagiri gives their references thus :—

(a) केचित्तु प्रकरणचतुष्टयात्मनो ग्रन्थस्य वेदान्तैकदेशसंबंधत्वज्ञापनार्थं . . ।

(b) अन्ये त्वाद्यश्लोकं मूलश्लोकान्तर्भूतमभ्युपगच्छन्तो . . . ।

(c) अपरे पुनराद्येन श्लोकेन . . . ।

These three quotations prove that the fourth chapter belongs to the author who also wrote the first three chapters. He is Gauḍapāda himself. This conclusion is supported by the references to him which Sureśvara makes in his works, *viz.*, नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि and बृहदारण्यकभाष्यवार्तिक. In the former work he figures in 4.11-12. In the latter work he refers to him and his work in the following places :—1. 2. 27; 1. 4. 389; 1. 4. 615; 1. 1. 712; 1. 1. 744; 2. 1. 2; 2. 1. 385; 4. 4. 886-888. That the commentary on this work together with the introductory verses is by Śāṅkara himself, we have no reason to doubt. Gauḍapāda, taking his stand on the Brahmadvaita of the Upaniṣads, demonstrated logically that there is the highest mystical goal, which is metaphysical as well. If he has met the nihilists on their own ground, especially in the fourth chapter, it is not unnatural to expect some of their terms and ideas being parodied. But as long as the Advaitic literature prior to Śāṅkara or Gauḍapāda has not come to light we cannot emphatically maintain that the Vedānta had not such or similar negative phrases and ideas. Besides we have shown that *Sūtasamhitā* and *Bhāgarata* which are prior to Śāṅkara contain such terminology. This takes us

to the standpoint of Gauḍapāda. We shall now see if it differs from the Vedānta of Śāṅkara.

In the four chapters, Gauḍapāda following the teaching of the Upaniṣads establishes the Ātmanavāda as the only and Absolute Reality. Thus he establishes his positive Absolute against the sceptic negativism of the nihilists. As he was mainly busy with this, he paid little attention to the phenomenon though he did not lose sight of it or reject it. He accepted its relative reality. His positive Absolute, which is the highest experience of a mystic, is described in the following verses. He calls it ब्रह्म 3. 46, (स्थिरं) ज्ञानं 3. 38, अद्वैतं 3. 18, परं ब्रह्म or प्रणव 1. 26 and 3. 12, (स्थिर) विज्ञानवाद 4. 45 and 48 as opposed to (अस्थिर), विज्ञानवाद of the Buddhists in 4. 99, ब्राह्मण्यं पदं 4. 85, अभयं पदं 4. 78, भगवान् 4. 82 and 84, and समाधि the mystic height in 3. 37. Here there is nothing except that, "Pure Isness", call it in any way (अस्ति तावत्स्वयं नाम ज्ञानं वात्मान्यदेव वा । उप. साह. 16. 31) as Śāṅkara observes. Here there is no question of dualism, causation and creation. He refers to this in 4. 71, 3. 48, 1. 17, 2. 31, 1. 7-9, 4. 4-5, 2. 19, 4. 58 where he observes that there is no "Māyā" at all. In this case, he admits that this Ajātivāda in 3. 26 is nothing but the same thing as the Neti-neti-vāda of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. But when one comes down from this mystical and metaphysical height there is the world of multiplicity and empiricism, where causation and creation are possible. He states this in 4. 56, 4. 42, 2. 29, 3. 15. He accepts that Māyā is relatively some positive entity, i.e., प्रण in 1. 16. It is not independent of the Brahman. In giving these facts he frankly admits that he was reasserting the Upaniṣadic view. In support of this statement he often refers to the passages from the Upaniṣads in 2. 3, 3. 11-15 and 3. 24-26. He mentions some of his predecessors also in 2. 12 and 2. 31. Śāṅkara deals with this double standpoint in the same way. In his *Tai. Up. Com.* 2. 6; *Br. Com.* 4. 4-25, 1. 4-7, 2. 1-10; *Māṇḍ. Com.* 3. 15; *Ait. Com.* 2 intro., he speaks nothing short of the Ajātivāda. Here there is सत् ब्रह्म only. But from the second standpoint the

question of creation is to be falsely ascribed to "It" through the instrumentality of Māyā as Śankara says "मायामयकार्यताम्" उप. सा. 8. 2. Here he takes the world to be relatively real and accepts the dualism of subject and object in the same work: (19. 4) स एव चात्मा जगत्तश्च नः. Under these circumstances, he introduces the question of creation and causation in उप. साह. 9. 1-3; *Ait. Up. Com.* 1. 2, 2 intro; *Br. Cōm.* 1. 2. 1, 1. 2-4; *Chhan. Com.* 6. 2-3; and *Br. Sut. Com.* 2. 3. 14. Generally he follows the order given in the *Tai. Upaniṣad* as regards creation. From this it will be clear that there is no difference between Gauḍapāda and Śankara. Gauḍapāda lays down the proposition in the first chapter. In the second he refutes all the dualistic objections brought against it. In the third he answers all the logical objections raised against it. In the last he examines the Buddhist subjective idealists and nihilists on their own ground and proves his proposition. Thus he has strengthened the position of the Brahmadvaita of the Upaniṣads.

When we come to Śankara we find that he has not only treated the Absolute with great emphasis but he has equally busied himself with the empirical world. This marked difference is due to his position although the material he handled or the standpoint he had was one and the same like Gauḍapāda. Gauḍapāda was an individual philosopher who reasserted his philosophical tradition. Śankara was more a leader or Āchārya of a new sect meant for socio-religious purposes. Śankara was thus bound to pay equal attention to lower as well as higher ideals and to face and answer all adverse and irresponsible criticisms. He attempted this Herculean task quite successfully. His realistic, synthetical and eclectic genius has given us the grand and graded religious staircase ascending the steps of which one can realize the Brahman. Śankara himself admits that he inherits hoary historicity and past experience in his attempts in the following quotation :—

“ तत्र अद्वैतदर्शनं न संप्रदायकर्तुः.” मां. का. भा. 4. 1.

We have so far answered the questions which we raised at the beginning. The Buddhists from the *Lankāvatāra sūtra* to Śāntarakṣita have been clearly stating their view as quite different from that of the Vedāntins, who are even criticised. The Vedāntins, on the other hand, from Gauḍapāda to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī have spared no pains to distinguish their standpoint from that of the two schools of the Mahāyāna. Here it may not be out of place to give in short the main points of difference between the Vedānta and two Buddhistic schools. These are quoted from *Vedānta Vindicated*, where they run thus:—

“There has been no compromise whatever between them ; for Advaita has nothing common with Buddhism ; it is war to the knife between them.

(i) Advaita did not borrow from Buddhism its idealism, since Advaita has rejected it unconditionally.

(ii) Nor did Advaita borrow its psychology, since the Buddhists deny the existence of the soul.

(iii) Nor the doctrine of illusion, since the Advaita's Māyā is altogether a different thing.

(iv) Nor the doctrine of the relative reality of the world, since the Buddhists hold the world to be mere illusion.

(v) Lastly, not even the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa, since the Advaita's Samādhi consists in the attainment of the identity with Brahman, and thereby of the consciousness of oneself and of all things ; while the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa consists in losing consciousness of oneself and of everything.

Wherefore, it is evident that, not only Advaita did not absorb Buddhism, but is its greatest foe. Advaita has had the merit of impugning and refuting many gross errors of Buddhism.” Pp. 142-43.

Who then levels this charge of being pseudo-Buddhists against the Vedāntins ? There is an interested third party that has manufactured this charge. We shall deal with it in the second part of this essay.

(To be continued.)

IS THE ADVAITA OF ŚĀNKARA BUDDHISM IN DISGUISE?

BY G. V. BUDHAKAR, B.A. (HONS.)

(Continued from Vol. XXIV, No. 2, p. 176)

II

THE school responsible for this attack follows a kind of realism in philosophy and theism in religion. It is dualistic in outlook and supports unity in diversity. Some modern scholars, even though they differ from this school, join hands with it as far as this charge is concerned. We have examined their position in the first part and shall come to them again in the third part. We have already mentioned the two views of idealism and realism based on the Upaniṣads. The school in question follows the second one and rejects the first. The commentaries of this school on the Upaniṣads and Brahma-sūtras, prior to Śānkara, are lost to us. We get some stray references to them in the works of Śānkara. He refers to them thus:—

केचिदुपनिषद्वाक्यान्तरा ब्रह्मवादानो । मां. का. भा. 3. 20.

अस्मदायाश्च केचित् । ब्र. सू. भा. 1. 3. 19.

औपनिषद्वदंमन्या अपि केचित् । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 2. 3. 6.

Many of the extant commentaries are later than Śānkara. This school believes as does Śānkara that the Brahma-sūtras systematise the teaching of the Upaniṣads. It is, therefore, necessary to see how far Śānkara makes the nearest possible approach to the original intention of the sūtras. We have, therefore, to examine his commentary on them and compare it with the commentaries of this school. Bhattabhāskara was the first of this school who came just after Śānkara and he was followed by others belonging to the Pāncharātriya school, viz., Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbārka and Baladeva. Vijnānabhikṣu does not belong to this school. All these have their commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras and differ

among themselves as regards the interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras. But all of them differ from Śāṅkara's interpretation of the same. As many of them have read their preconceived ideas into the sūtras, it is difficult to make out their real import. Again, matters are more confounded by the innovation of modern scholarship as it is not serious about religious values and rejects scriptural authority. It subjects these texts to mere intellectual and historical criticism and holds that in the Upaniṣads there are passages which support Śāṅkara but not so in the sūtras ; but this view is unanimously contradicted by the orthodox commentators just now referred to who emphatically assert that the sūtras give the teaching of the Upaniṣads in a nut-shell. If the author of the sūtras is prepared to give the teaching of the Upaniṣads in its entirety and if there are passages in the Upaniṣads that support Śāṅkara, there is no reason why there should not be the passages that can support Śāṅkara in the sūtras especially as the author of the sūtras gives both theistic and absolutistic views. We will show this in the following lines.

• He mentions the Māyāvāda in 2. 1. 11. Here all the commentators except Śāṅkara have evaded the implication of the words, “वाचारम्भणं” and “एव” from the original Upaniṣadic text. The two words exclude the phenomenon and assert only the Absolute Reality. Śāṅkara properly interprets them while others intentionally connive at them. The Pariṇāmavāda as leading to this Māyāvāda is referred to in 2. 1. 13. In neither of these two sūtras is there any word like “तु” which can show the disapproval of any one of these two views. Both are true and are accepted by the author according to the different stages of religious or philosophical evolution. Śāṅkara here aptly remarks:—

सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थमिप्रायेण तदनन्यत्वमित्याह । व्यवहाराभिप्रायेण तु स्याल्लोकवदिति महासमुद्रम्यानीयतां ब्रह्मणः कथयति । अप्रत्याख्यायैव कार्यप्रपञ्चं परिणामप्राक्रियां चाश्रयति सगुणपूपासनेषूपयोक्ष्यत इति ॥

In this way, absolute unity and phenomenal diversity are reconciled as not conflicting but as the latter leading to the

former, *i.e.*, unity in diversity being a step leading to absolute monism. In 2. 3. 7 it is maintained that any change or विकार (परिणाम) is true on the empirical plane only. The Absolute is above any change, because in 1. 1. 13 it is absolutely denied.

In 3. 2. 11 and 3. 2. 16 the Nirguṇa Brahman is mentioned. In 3. 2. 22 there are both the Sagūṇa and Nirguṇa aspects of Brahman. The latter is higher than the former and it is the causeless cause. Creation is true in the case of the former. This creation or sport supports theism. For that purpose the lower aspect of the Reality is accepted.

In 1. 1. 30, 4.1.3 and 1. 4. 22 the absolute unity of Brahman and Jiva is treated. In 2. 3. 50 and 3. 2. 18 the individual soul is asserted to be nothing but an illusory division from the ultimate standpoint. एव in both the cases shows absolute emphasis. The objection in the following sūtras is explained empirically. Both 3. 2. 21 and the first sūtra of the next topic turn again to the subject treated before. In 2. 3. 50 and in the following topic the partial limitation of souls due to plurality is denied. The section (पाद) ends there. The sūtra 2. 3. 50, therefore, remains as the ultimate view of the author. In 2. 3. 33-39 activity is accepted empirically: its absence in 40 is stated absolutely. In 2. 3. 18 and 1. 1. 6 individual souls are taken to be knowledge itself. It is neither the substratum of it as the Vaiśeṣikas say nor without it as the Sāṅkhyas observe. In 1. 1. 30, 1. 1. 22, 3. 2. 29-31, 1. 1. 3 the sūtras stand at the end of the topic (अधिकरण). The subject succeeding 1. 1. 30, 1. 1. 22, and 1. 1. 3 is quite different from that treated in these sūtras. They cannot be connected with anything else and no other meaning can be read into them. This is shown without torturing or evading any word. In 1. 1. 31 the plurality of egos is meant for theistic purposes and not final.

Sūtras 4. 4. 1, 1. 4. 1, 4. 4. 19 refer to the type of absolutism (मुक्ति) that is beyond any change and in which every difference is sublated for ever in the case of individual souls

and the Brahman. There can be no possibility of the divine sport due to distinction as held by the theists; because that is true in the Saguna aspect with which is connected the second type of absolutism (मुक्ति) treated in 4. 1. 22, 4. 4. 9, 4. 4. 18, and 4. 4. 21.

Such is the sketch of the salient points in the Brahma-sūtras. It shows that the author gives both the theistic and absolutistic views as true according to the religious calibre of an aspirant. They are not contradictory but complementary. He gives the views of other teachers like Audulomi and Aśmarathya in 1. 1. 21, 3. 2. 28; 1. 1. 20, 3. 2. 27; who support theism and unity in diversity. But these views are given as lower or partial opinions (एकदेशमतानि). The author gives the view of Kāśakritsna in 1. 4. 22 as the ultimate and highest view. Thus it is clear that the author is giving the thought of the Upaniṣads in its twofold aspect. There is no conflict or divergency between the Upaniṣads and the author of the sūtras. Śāṅkara interprets the theistic sūtras as they are. But the theistic commentators over-emphasize their standpoint and twist the sūtras, which go against their view, to suit their purpose. The first attempt of this kind after Śāṅkara we find in the work of Bhattabhāskara. His avowed object was to attack Śāṅkara as he says thus in his work:—

सूत्राभिप्रायसंवृत्त्या स्वाभिप्रायप्रकाशनान् ।

व्याख्यानं यैरिदं शास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निरवृत्तये ॥

साम्कर. व्र. मू. भाष्य, Chawkhambha Series.

He supports the lower aspect of the Brahman, accepts Pariṇāmavāda, and follows unity in diversity between the Supreme Soul and individual souls. He calls Śāṅkara a Buddhist in disguise. He remarks that there are some sūtras, which favour monism and others which treat dualism (p. 84; sūtra 1. 4. 21). From this the logical conclusion which he draws is that unity in diversity is the ultimate goal (p. 221; sūtra 4. 1. 3). He relies more on the passages like 3. 2. 25-27 and says that the difference due to limitations is the final truth. He reconciles activity (कर्म) and knowledge (ज्ञान). He says that the interpretation of Śāṅkara is forced and uncalled

for. He is inclined more towards Audulomi and Aśmarathya than towards Kāśakritsna.

To his credit we must say that he is right as far as the psychological (आधिदैविक) standpoint is concerned where unity in diversity (भेदाभेदवाद) is the ultimate outcome and theism is the last appeal. Besides, he is free from the sectarian bias of the Pāncharātrins. As far as this standpoint is concerned there is very little difference between him and them. The main defect with him is that he proceeds with the object of attacking Śankara and not as an independent and comprehensive interpreter. On account of this reason his work has become sketchy and imperfect especially in the case of those sūtras which go against his view.

But the experience of Yogic mystics points to a higher goal

.... अभेद एव त्वत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषितो ब्रह्मात्मत्वप्रतिपत्तो पुरुषार्थमिद्वेः ।

शां. ब्र. सू. भा. 2. 3. 47.

The dialectic of philosophers goads them to something that is ultimate and final. Nothing short of that satisfies them. Any halting compromise seems to them to be self-contradictory. Śankara thus remarks:—नित्यनिरवयववस्तुविषये हि विरुद्धत्वमवोचाम द्वैताद्वैतस्य । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 5. 1. 1. Besides, there are passages in the Upaniṣads and sūtras, which cannot be properly and satisfactorily explained unless we follow the standpoint of the absolutists like Śankara. The ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवाद of Bhattabhāskara is all right for our practical affairs in life. “व्यवहारो तु भाट्टिनयः” this opinion of the Mimāṃsakas is accepted by the Vedāntins. But this cannot be reconciled with the highest spiritual experience, where nothing short of actionlessness is possible. Śankara remarks,

तस्मात्सर्वदुःखविनिर्मुक्तैर्कथेतन्यात्मकोऽहमिदं प आत्मानुभवः ।

न चैवमात्मानुभवतः किञ्चिदन्यत्कृत्यमवशिष्यते । ब्र. सू. भा. 4. 1. 2.

Thus we see that this authoritarian or institutional, mystical or personal, and logical or philosophical trio converges to the same goal. This brings us to the standpoint of Śankara. Bhattabhāskara, therefore, cannot be our final guide. He is accepted as a necessary step to the Highest Ideal,

The next important commentator on the *Brahma-sūtras* is Rāmānuja. He belongs to the Pāncharātriya school. His main object was to support theism with sane thought and to seek, if possible, some Vedic support for his school. For all these attempts he depended on the abridged edition of the original Bodhāyanavritti on the sūtras. For this reason some importance and glamour are in his work. Let us trace the history of his school. In the *Mahābhārata* where different philosophical schools are mentioned, the Pāncharātriya is not included in the purely Vedic fold. In the *Brahma-sūtras* also they are ranked among the systems, which the author wants to attack as opposed to Vedic thought. In *Maṇimekhalai* five Vedavādas, viz., Vedavāda, Brahmavāda, Pramāṇavāda, Viśṇuvāda and Śivavāda, are mentioned but this school is absent. Chandrakīrti, the author of a commentary on the *Mādhyaṃika-kārika*, mentions it as a separate school on p. 159, ll. 7-8:—

प्रकृतीश्वरस्वभावकालाणुनारायणजैमिनिकणादकपिलादितीर्थकरवादनिरासेन ।

(Biblo. Buddhica Edn.)

Here by the word, “नारायण” he probably refers to this school, because in the *Mahābhārata* he is called the first originator of it. Chandrakīrti speaks of Vedic theism thus:—
बुद्धिपूर्वकर्तृकं च पुरुषादिकारिणो जगदभ्युपगच्छन्तः (p. 100, l. 1, *ibid.*)

In the *Harṣacharita* the Pāncharātriya is separately mentioned as quite different from Vedic (Upaniṣadic) and Bhāgavata schools (p. 220, ch. 8, para. 5, cf. p. 15 supra). Kumārila in his *Tantravārtika* (1.3.3. 3 and 4) includes it among the schools which are not purely Vedic. The schools mentioned are the Śākya, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāncharātriya, Pāśupata and others. Medhātithi in his commentary on the *Manu-smṛiti* (2.6) follows him. From all these references, it is clear that Rāmānuja's zealous attempts to prove his school to be purely Vedic were in vain. The moment he tries to defend his position in the Br.-sūtras 2.2.42-45, one is doubtful about the previous history of his school. Madhva goes a step further and asserts a bold and startling truth:—

वेदपांचरात्रयोरैक्याभिप्रायेण पांचरात्रस्यैव प्रामाण्यमुक्तं । मध्व ब्र. सू. भा. 1. 1. 3. He states that the authority of the Pāncharātra is far superior to that of the Veda. But this makes his position all the more questionable. In the Br.-Sūtras 2.2.42-45 Madhva, Baladeva and Nimbārka have introduced the Śaktivāda to avoid the refutation of their school. Vallabha accepts partial refutation. Vijnānabhikṣu is not explicit here but in 1.1.3 of the same he tries to prove that the author supported the Sāṅkhya and Pāncharātra. His “अविभागद्वैत” is not different from the qualified monism of Rāmānuja and others. But the introduction of the Śaktivāda in the Br.-Sūtras 2.2.42-45 cannot be accepted on the authority of Śankara and Bhattabhāskara, the oldest available commentators. Moreover Rāmānuja is quite conscious of his weak point. He frankly admits this in his Śribhāṣya:—

एवमात्मशरीरभावेन तादात्म्योपपादने परस्य ब्रह्मणोपहतपाम्पत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादि-
गोचरा जीवस्याविदुषः शोचतो ब्रह्मोपासनान्मोक्षवादित्यो जगत्सृष्टिप्रलयाभिधायिन्यो
जगतो ब्रह्मतादात्म्योपदेशापराश्च श्रुतयः सर्वाः सम्यगुपपादिता भवन्तीति काश-
कृत्स्नीयमेवमतं सूत्रकारः स्वीकृतवान् । 1. 1. 22, p. 381, ll. 5-10,
Bombay San. Series Edn.

Thus it is clear that his qualified monism is not the ultimate view of the author. This completely knocks off his support. Śivakanṭha in his *Brahmamīmāṃsā* has similar remarks on the same sūtra:—

इदमेव मतं सूत्रकारस्य मतद्वयमुपन्यस्य तद्विरोधेनैतदभिधानादनन्यस्याभि-
धानाच्च निश्चीयते । But in the commentary on 2. 2. 35 he connives at the refutation of the Pāśupata school, which he follows. He brings in the “एकदेशिनस्तान्त्रिकाः” who are neither meant by the author nor introduced by Śankara and Bhāskara. The Pāncharātrins say that the Brahma-sūtras do not contain the terminology of Śankara *viz.*, “माया, मिथ्या, विवर्त, उपाधि, अविद्या, etc.” But if the same question is driven against them can they point out their terms like “व्यूह, प्रकार, चिदचिद्विशिष्ट, etc.” in the sūtras? The negative phraseology of Śankara can be traced back to the Upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya*, *Śvetāsvatara* and *Maitrāyaṇiya*.

Now about the Bodhāyanavritti of which so much is made. In *Prapancha-hṛdaya* the following reference occurs:

तस्य विंशत्यध्यायनिबद्धस्य मीमांसाशास्त्रस्य कृतकोटिनामधेयं भाष्यं बोधायनेन कृतम् । तद्वन्थबाहुल्यभयात् उपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्संक्षिप्तं उपवर्षेण कृतम् ।

इति उपाङ्गप्रकरणे ॥

We have referred to this extract in the previous pages. Śāṅkara in his commentary on the Br.-sūtras 1. 3. 28 & 3. 3. 53 mentions Upavarṣa with great regard as “भगवान्”. Nowhere does he contradict him. In the same manner does Śabara in his commentary on the *Purvamīmāṃsā-sūtras* 1. 1. 5 refer to him. If Śāṅkara has great respect for Upavarṣa and if Upavarṣa simply abridged the Bodhāyanavritti, we can say that there was the continuity of thought and interpretation between Śāṅkarā and Bodhāyana. Śāṅkara whose view we have mentioned elsewhere is not against such a conclusion. It is true that from the works of Śāṅkara it seems that he had no direct access to the work of Bodhāyana as he nowhere refers to it directly or otherwise. Nor does he throw any light on one Vṛttikār Kāṇva Bodhāyana mentioned in the Bhāradvāja Gr.-sūtra 3. 11, हि. के. गृ. सू. 2.20.1, बा. गृ. सू. 3.9.6, बा. ध. सू. 2.5.27. It is also doubtful whether this vritti was on the Br.-sūtras or any Gr.-sūtra. He criticises one Vṛttikār but he cannot be either of the two commentators, i.e., Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa. Ānandagiri, therefore, is wrong on the Br.-sūtras 3. 3. 53 (p. 370 Āna. Āsh. Series) when he identifies Upavarṣa with the Vṛttikār. It is unnatural to expect that Śāṅkara, who called Upavarṣa “Bhagavān”, should severely criticise him. He refers to the same man as the commentator of *Bhagavad-Gītā* prior to Śāṅkara though Śāṅkara is not particular about one and the same man:—

तदर्थविवरणायानेकैर्विवृतपदपदार्थवाक्यार्थन्यायम्

टी. पूर्वाचार्यैर्व्याख्यातत्वात् । वृत्तिकारैर्दर्शितस्तथाऽपि

P. 6, Āna. Āsh. Series.

He is mentioned in *Tai. Up. Com. Sub-com. p. 68, 2. 5*; where Ānandagiri says:—आनन्दमयः परमात्मेति वृत्तिकारैरुक्तं तादृशिषेधेन

व्याचष्टे. But while commenting on the Vārtik of the same (pp. 107–108, verses 23–26) he is silent. In the *Chândogya* Com. on the passage “अत्र आहुः केचित्”, he says to the following effect :—

स्वव्याख्यानं वर्जितदोषं उक्त्वा ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति इत्यत्र वृत्तिकारीयं व्याख्यानं उत्थापयति (p. 116, 2. 31. 1). Again in *Br. Up. Com. Sub-com.* (p. 151, 3rd edn., 1. 4. 10) he observes:—तत्रवृत्तिकृतां मतानुसारेण ब्रह्मशब्दार्थमाह and on p. 152 of the same *Bhartṛprapancha* is mentioned. But Suresvara in his Vārtika of the same speaks of *Bhartṛprapancha* only (1. 4. 10, verses 1124–1161, Part II). From all these references and extracts it cannot be said that Ānandagiri depended on any first-hand information. He is, it seems, uncertain about the identification of the Vrittikār. Śāṅkara does not make any difference between a Vritti and a Bhāṣya. In the introduction to his commentaries on the *Chândogya* and *Kaṭha* he calls them Vrittis. They, on the other hand, are known as Bhāṣyas. Again about the Vrittikār it is doubtful if he refers to one and the same man because Padmapāda, his direct disciple and the first commentator of his *Br.-sūtra* commentary mentions four such authorities, who are criticised by Śāṅkara. The following extracts refer to them :—

(a) इत्यन्यैरपि स्ववृत्तौ वर्णितम् ।

(b) तथा च वृत्त्यन्तरे वर्णितम् (both on p. 58) :

again on p. 64,

(c) तत्र अन्यैः वृत्तिकारैः ब्रह्मशब्दमर्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य.

(d) वृत्त्यन्तरे तु शेषलक्षणा व्याख्याता । Vol. II, Part I.

Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

Śābara in his *Purva-mīmāṃsā* commentary (1.1.5) says:—वृत्तिकारस्तु अन्यथा इमं ग्रन्थं वर्णयाम्कार. After this he gives a quotation. In this *Upavaṣṣa* is referred to. It would, therefore, be wrong if we suppose that the Vrittikār meant by him was Bodhāyana. Then there will be anachronism, because *Bodhāyana* long preceded *Upavaṣṣa*. He could not be *Upavaṣṣa* also, because he is mentioned in the passage. He might be Devaśvāmī or Bhavadās, who, according to *Prapan-cha-hṛdaya*, are Śāṅkara's predecessors. But this work refers

to their works on the *Purva-mīmāṃsā* only. From Śabara, therefore, we cannot get any definite information. Yāmūnāchārya, in his *Siddhitrāya*, observes thus:—

यद्यपि भगवता वादरायणेन इदमर्थान्येव सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि, विवृतानि च परिमितगंभीरभाषिणा भाष्यकृता, विस्तृतानि च तानि गंभीरन्यायसागरभाषिणा भगवता श्रीवत्सांकमिश्रेणापि ; तथापि आचार्यदंक—भर्तृप्रपंच—भर्तृमित्र—भर्तृहरि—ब्रह्मदत्त—शंकर—श्रीवत्सांक—भास्करादि विरचितसितासितविविधनिबंधनश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धये यथावदन्यथा च प्रतिपद्यते इति तत्प्रतिपत्तये युक्तः प्रकरणक्रमः ।

Pp. 5-6. Chaukhambha Edn.

If the authorities mentioned are in a chronological order we can say that there were seven commentators on the Br.-sūtras prior to Śāṅkara. Some were Pāṇcharātrins and the others belonged to some other schools like Bhartṛprapaṇcha and Brahmadatta, who were criticised by Śāṅkara and Suresvara as pointed out by Ānandagiri and others. Vidyāsurabhi, a commentary on the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (1. 67) says, “ इति कचिन् ब्रह्मदत्तादयः ”. Ānandagiri on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika* (Part I, Sambandhavārtika, verse 797) observes:—इहतु ब्रह्मदत्तादिमतेन ज्ञानाभ्यासे विधिमाशंक्य निरस्यते. It has been already stated that Suresvara mentions Bhartṛprapaṇcha. Both Bhartṛprapaṇcha and Brahmadatta were “ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवादिनः”. According to Ānandagiri, Śāṅkara refers to Bhartṛprapaṇcha twenty-two times (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Com. Āna. Āsh. Series, 3rd edition: p. 2, 1. 1; 152, 151, 1. 4. 10; 187, 1. 4. 14; 190, 1. 4. 14; 208, 1. 5. 2; 236, 1. 5. 18; 316, 2. 2. 2; 324, 2. 3. 3; 328, 2. 3. 6. 1st edition: 345, 2. 5; 396, 3. 2. 13; 424, 3. 4. 2; 427, 3. 5. 1; 534, 4. 3. 7; 586, 589, 4. 3. 22; 594, 597, 1. 3. 24-30; 658, 4. 4. 22; 699, 700, 5. 1. 1).

From these constant and vigorous attacks one would be tempted to assert that Bhartṛprapaṇcha was the Vṛttikār. But just now it is shown that Ānandagiri mentions both of them separately in the same context. We have no means to examine his reference, but one thing is certain that Suresvara makes no such distinction. Bhartṛmitra was a commentator on the *Purva-mīmāṃsā* prior to Kumārila.

But nothing is known about his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*. Bhartṛhari was the author of *Vākyapadiya*, a grammatical work. He followed the *Śabdādwaita*. Nothing more is known about him. It seems that Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛprapancha, Bhartṛhari and Brahmadata might be the four commentators meant by Śankara and criticised by Padmapāda. But one thing which deserves special attention in the above extract from the work of Yāmunāchārya is that both *Bodhāyana* and *Upavarṣa* are conspicuously absent. Was it because they did not support his view? In that case, neither of the two can be the *Vṛttikār*. Such a surmise is strengthened when we come to Rāmānuja, who refers to one *Vṛttikār*. He relies on the *Bodhāyanavṛtti* that was abridged by somebody. Can this person be *Upavarṣa*, whom we know to have done the same work? But Rāmānuja scarcely refers to him. No scholar has brought any evidence to prove that Rāmānuja depended on him. *Vedāntadeśika* in his *Tattva-tika* on the *Śribhāṣya* says that *Upavarṣa* is *Bodhāyana*. But this is disproved by *Prapancha-bhāṣya*. His words are, “वृत्तिकारस्यैव हि उपवर्ष इति स्यात्ताम्.” He does not make any difference between the *Vṛttikār* and *Bodhāyana* or *Upavarṣa*. Yāmunāchārya in the above quotation refers to the first commentator; but does not care to name him definitely as if he does not support him. But we have shown that this first commentator was *Bodhāyana*. Whether he refers to *Bodhāyana* or *Upavarṣa* we cannot say definitely. But judging from the epithets he showers on Śrīvatsāṅkamiśra and Tanka, we can say that he was not so much inclined towards this first commentator as he was towards the two latter. From this we can definitely say that they were *Pāñcharātrins*; because the first is called “भगवान्” and the second “आचार्य”. The first must have been the important guide of Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja in his *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* (Benares edition Pandit, p 148) refers to the following authorities:—

भगवद्वाधायन-टंक-द्रामिड-गुहदेव-कपर्दि-भारुचिप्रभृत्यविगीत-शिष्टपरिगृहीत
पुरातन वेदवेदान्त व्याख्यान सुव्यक्तार्थ श्रुतिनिकरनिदर्शितोऽयं पन्थाः ।

Here all the persons are not necessarily the commentators on the Brah̥ma-sūtras ; because he uses the words Veda and Vedānta. Guhadeva, Bhāruchi and Kapardin are Vedic commentators as Devarāja in his commentary on the *Nighantu* says. We have just now come across Tanka as a commentator. Dramida, who is referred to by Madhva, has done the same thing. But the identification of Tanka with Brahmanandi, as observed by Sudarśanasūri in his *Tātparyadeepikā*, is wrong. Nor can this Dramida be identified with the Drāvida of Śankara. Both Dravida and Brahmanandi are proved to be completely absolutists. Bodhāyana seems to be a name of mere antiquity to Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja, it appears, had not any direct access to his work. This is clear from the following extract from his *Śrībhāṣya* :

भगवद्बोधायनकृतां विस्तार्या ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः चिक्षिपुः । तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते ।

From these three extracts it appears that Rāmānuja followed the work of Śrivatsāṅkamiśra as well as those of Tanka and Dramida. He refers to Dramida in his *Śrībhāṣya* 2. 2. 3. As Rāmānuja is silent about Upavarṣa and as Yāmunaāchārya gives prominence to Śrivatsāṅkamiśra we can safely assert that the abridged edition of the original commentary on the Br.-sūtras, which Rāmānuja followed, was by Śrivatsāṅkamiśra, who was a Pāṇcharātrin. But if the Vrittikār, whom Śankara criticises, were to be a Pāṇcharātrin, Rāmānuja would not have spared pains in defending him against all the attacks. The Vrittikār of Śankara, therefore, was quite a different person. In the following verses, Madhva refers to one Vrittikār on the Br.-sūtras :—

भारतीविजयश्चैव संविदानन्द एव च ।

ब्रह्मघोषः शतानन्द उद्धतश्चैव पञ्चमः ॥ १ ॥

विजयो रुद्रभट्टश्च वामनाख्यस्तथाष्टमः ।

स यादवप्रकाशश्च नवमः स्तत्र कीर्तितः ॥ २ ॥

रामानुजस्तथा भर्तृप्रपञ्चो द्रविडस्तथा ।

ब्रह्मदत्तो भास्करश्च पिशाचो वृत्तिकारकः ॥ ३ ॥

तथा विजयभट्टश्च विष्णुकान्तस्तथैव च ।

वादीन्द्रश्च तथा पञ्चात्ततो माधवदासकः ॥ ४ ॥

ततश्च शंकरश्च स्यादेकविंशतिवादिभिः ।

In this list, there are twenty-one commentators of the Br.-sūtras ; but it is not exhaustive as it neither mentions some of the authorities of Yāmūnāchārya nor does it speak anything about Bodhāyana or Upavarṣa. We have not got sufficient evidence to identify this Vṛttikār with Upavarṣa or Śrīvatsāṅkamaśra.

From this discussion, it follows that the one Vṛttikār, to whom Śankara refers, who is criticised by Śankara, on whom Rāmānuja depends, and whom Madhva quotes, is not one and the same person. It is doubtful whether the word Vṛttikār has any particular reference as the word vṛtti has no technical meaning. The question of identification of the Vṛttikār as handled by the mediæval commentators like Ānandagiri, Vedāntadeśika and Sudarśanasūri is seriously questionable. Rāmānuja's predecessor who abridged the Bodhāyana-vṛtti is a Pāncharātrīn and not Upavarṣa, since he is shown to be respected by Śankara as an important authority of his tradition. He and indirectly Bodhāyana are favourable to Śankara. Rāmānuja, therefore, loses this last support. From various sources it is proved that his school is semi-Vedic if not purely Vedic. The author of the Br.-sūtras does not support him as the final goal. Rāmānuja himself admits this. From the psychological standpoint there is very little difference between his “विशिष्टद्वैत and औपाधिक-द्वैतद्वैत of Bhattabhāskara though they differ in minor details and methods. Rāmānuja is such an important theistic thinker that all the later commentators of the Br.-sūtras have got very little original to add or to surpass him. Next to Śankara, his influence is so great that he is an important religious personality and his services to the cause of Hinduism are certainly incalculable.

One very important difference between Śankara and the other commentators is that Śankara's system is matchless and unassailable as regards its philosophical depth and subtilty.

He restricts himself mainly to the Śruti for his inspiration and support.' His system, therefore, is certainly Śrauta in the full sense of the term. Sane and serious philosophers cannot but welcome his system. But the systems of the other commentators are not pitched on such a high level. They are satisfied with the gross and concrete ideas and images of the Purāṇas and never look into their inner significance. For this they have often to quote the Purāṇas. Their systems, therefore, are Paurāṇika. They are useful for the masses. Both the systems form the full-fledged Hinduism and are complementary. The question, whether Śankara has made sufficient provision for the masses, will be treated later on. But the above intellectual depth and sobriety have made Śankara's system liberal and comprehensive. But on account of this lack the systems of other commentators are narrow and intolerant not only towards others but even among themselves.

(To be continued.)

IS THE ADVAITA OF ŚĀṆKARA BUDDHISM IN DISGUISE ?

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(Continued from Vol. XXIV, No. 3, p. 265)

SIDE by side with the Pāncharātrins there are the Bhāgavatas referred to in the *Harṣacharita* (8. 5, p. 220). Can they be those, who unlike the Pāncharātrins, were liberal worshippers of Viṣṇu and who professed the Advaita of the type, which Śāṅkara maintains in philosophy and followed “भक्ति” and “कर्म” in life. Śāṅkara calls his system, “भागवतं मतं” thrice (18. 48) and “औपनिषदं दर्शनं” (13. 31) in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. He is very near such a school. In his commentaries there are references to “शालिग्राम” and “विष्णुप्रतिमा” (म. गी. भा. 4. 24 ; ब्र. सू. भा. 1. 3. 14, 1. 2. 14, 1. 2. 7, 3. 3. 9, 4. 1. 3, 4. 1. 5 ; छां. उ. भा. 8. 1. 1, 6. 16. 2 or 3 ; बृ. आ. उ. भा. 1. 3. 1, 3. 7. 3, to नारायण 5. 1. 1 ; तै. उ. भा. 1. 6. 1, 1. 8 ; प्र. उ. भा. 5. 2). He begins his commentary on the *Gītā* with great regard to Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Yet his open mind is prepared to respect the old Vedic “पंचायतनपूजा” (आश्व. गृ. सू. प. 2. 10) as it is stated by him in his commentary on the *Kenopaniṣad* (1. 5. पदभाष्य) thus:—उपास्यः विष्णुरीश्वरः इन्द्रः प्राणो वा ब्रह्म भवितुमर्हति । Besides he has composed many hymns in praise of different gods and goddesses. Prior to Śāṅkara there was such a school ; because the *Vaikhāṇas Gri. Sūtra*, which is referred to by Viśvarūpa (*Yā. Śmṛi. Com.*, 3. 3. 46) and Medhātithi (*Manu Śmṛi. Com.*, 6. 21) is completely monist in philosophy and is devoted to Viṣṇu (*Vaik. Gri. Sūtra*, 1. 9 ; 4. 10 ; 1. 5 ; 1. 7 ; 2. 4 ; 3. 7). In 8. 9 it says that the Advaita is the highest end :—

क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनो योगं ज्ञात्वा यदतीन्द्रियं सर्वजगद्बीजमशेषविशेष नित्यानन्द-
ममृततरुसपानवत्सर्वदातृक्षिकरं परं ज्योतिस्तत्प्रवेशकं इति ज्ञायते ।

This school might be of the Vaikhānasas or Bhāgavatas. Ānandagiri in his *Śankaravijaya* has the following verse, which refers to these Vaikhānasas:—

भक्ता भागवताश्चैव वैष्णवाः पांचरात्रिणः ।

वैखानसाः कर्महीनाः षड्विधा वैष्णवा मताः ॥ ch. 6.

It is not known what the source of this verse is but from the reference given just now the distinctions among the Vaiṣṇavas are clear. The Pāncharātrins alone were not the Vaiṣṇavas nor “भक्ति” was their special property. They say that Śankara is a dry philosopher and a cold logical juggler. If by “भक्ति” they mean that it is unbridled sentimental excess Śankara is not surely a devotee of that type. In him reason and sentiment are combined and well balanced. He has reasoned faith. The different poetic and pathetic appeals he makes to religious aspirants sound like impassioned prose. They are both mystical and sincerely devotional. They are in his commentaries on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* (4. 3. 35; 4. 4. 2), *Chhāndogya* (6. 11. 2), *Mundaka* (1. 2. 12; 3. 1. 2), *Aitareya* (2. 1), *Praśna* (5. 1-2; 6. 8), *Kaṭha* (6. 1), *Bh. Gītā* (10. 11). He accepts the necessity of “भक्ति” or “सगुणोपासना” to as a step his Advaita. This is clear from his following allusions:—

भक्तिप्रसादं स्नेहाभिषिक्तम् । भ. गी. भा. 10. 11.

जपोपवासदेवताराधनादिभिः । ब्र. सू. भा. 3. 4. 38.

विष्ण्वादिप्रतिमास्थानीये भक्त्यावेशितब्रह्मभावे । प्र. उ. भा. 5. 2.

तस्मान्मुमुक्षु देवाराधनपरः श्रद्धाभक्तिपरः... स्यात् ।

बृ. आ. उ. भा. 1. 4. 10.

इति श्रद्धाभक्तिभ्यां भावविशेषेण चोक्तं आवश्ययति । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 5. 1. 1.

His hymns are famous for their ardent devotion. He combines in him deep philosophical thought, subtle reasoning, and acute as well as constructive dialectic with the simple poetical pathos of a true devotee. As a philosopher he handles the most abstruse and philosophical topics with masterly ease and accuracy. His remarks as a serious metaphysician and constructive philosopher are illuminating and instructive in the following lines:—

न तु अन्तरालकल्पनायां प्रमाणमस्ति । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 4. 4. 7.

न च वस्तुनोऽर्धजरतीयत्वं कल्पयितुं युक्तं तत्त्वज्ञानविवक्षायाम् । . . .

. . . . अतो न संशयितोऽर्थः वाच्यः परहितार्थिना ।

बृ. आ. उ. भा. 1. 4. 10.

न चैतच्छब्दरूपेण वाक्येन रक्षणीयं वस्तु । भ. गी. भा. 4. 18.

There are similar remarks in his commentaries on the *Praśna* (6. 3) and *Māndūkya-Kārika* (3. 17-18) Upaniṣads. In all these, he is definite and unequivocal. He always breathes sane and healthy reasoning. His style also is simple yet grand, and graceful and full of perspicuity. Here we cannot but quote the words of an eminent Indian scholar: "Fascinating, weird music; lucid, chaste, powerful, balanced expression; universal, unsectarian, fearless, loving expression;—these are some of the characteristics of his varied literary style. He was a real master of the philosophy he preached; he can express it in half a verse or a quarto volume of many hundred pages. He would readily break a lance with any adversary, atheist, materialist, ritualist, magician, ascetic, Yogi, or Tāntric".* The charge that a philosopher can never be a poet or in other words "भक्ति" cannot be reconciled with "ज्ञान" in life is stoutly disproved by Śāṅkara and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. The latter was the author of अद्वैतसिद्धि and भक्तिरसायन. We have dealt with this point here at great length to disprove the belief held in some quarters that Śāṅkara in his dialectical zeal has thrown theism overboard. He accepts it as a necessary step but does not exalt it at the cost of the Highest Ideal. From the foregoing discussion, it must have been clear that the Sūtrakār's main responsibility was to codify the teaching of the Upaniṣads in its entire aspect and that of a commentator to elucidate and give the exposition of the same. If both of them have achieved this task satisfactorily they are held authoritative. They have no independent value. Their codification and exposition should make the nearest possible approach to the teaching of the Upaniṣads. We have shown above that both the Sūtrakār and Śāṅkara have discharged

* M. N. Dvivedi's *Imitations of Śāṅkara*, Intro., p. ix.

their duties quite ably and faithfully. The commentators like Bhartṛprapancha, Bhāskara and others have laid great emphasis on qualified monism and distorted the passages, which go against their view. It is also brought to notice that the Pāncharātrins tried to superimpose their views on the sūtras although the Sūtrakār directed his polemics against them. What then was the view of the Sūtrakār as understood by the people beginning from the Vaiśeṣikas down up to the Pāncharātrins, whose views he attacks? Many modern scholars think that on account of the sketchy and enigmatic wording of the sūtras it is very difficult to find out the original intention of the author or to come to any definite conclusion. If this is really so, no interpretation of the sūtras which they give can be meant by the author. The different schools, which the author criticizes, are unanimous in ascribing a definite view to him when they attack him in their works. All of them agree with the view that he is systematising the Brahmādvaita of the Upaniṣads. This is what Śankara expounds. The author of *Vyāsātītparyanirṇaya* has dealt with it to some extent. But he has omitted the Buddhists and Jains.

It is necessary to make the philosophical and religious outlooks of both these schools clear so that we can understand the baselessness of the charge that Śankara's philosophy is simply Buddhism in disguise. Those, who bring this charge, are realists. They want to keep for ever the distinction between subject and object. They are afraid of the idea of getting themselves merged into the Boundless lest they should lose their individuality. They want that God, the world, and individual souls should be three distinct realities for ever. They are satisfied with this lot and question the possibility of any standpoint higher than this. In short, to them taste is truth. They want to read reality in terms of their taste. This they want to emphasise as ultimate and final. But Śankara says that truth is not always pleasant or agreeable. Those who have not got sufficient moral equipment and mental ability should stick to this goal. But those, who have keen and penetrating intellect, complete ethical preparation,

and a heart that is full of noble sentiments at once take up the high jump and merge themselves into the Eternal to gain immensely and immeasurably. In his commentary on the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (4.10) Śāṅkara thus observes:—
 यस्तु सर्वव्यापी (सः) सर्वज्ञः । To him truth is not momentary emotionalism limited by narrow individualism. But it is the eternal and never-ending Bliss Itself with which one can never part. It is perfect Bliss, Knowledge, and Existence. He arrives at this with the rigorous logic of philosophers and the highest mystical experience. At this stage the proper interpretation and import of scriptural passages are actually realized without the help of learnedly ignorant explanations. Thus the trilogy of the highest spiritual experience, the absolutistic scriptural passages in the Upaniṣads and other works, and the logical transcendentalism of philosophers stands on an invisible and unimpeachable height where the attacks of realists and theists are aimless and misdirected.

This dizzy height is bound to be negative and unrealizable for ordinary men. Śāṅkara anticipates this objection in his commentary on the *Chhândogya* (8. 1. 1):—

दिग्देशजाति फलभेदश्चैवं हि परमार्थसद्वयं ब्रह्म मन्दबुद्धीनामसदिव प्रतिभाति ।
 When the realists and theists confound the standpoint of Śāṅkara with Buddhistic nihilism and dry idealism, they mean it in this sense. We have already made the subtle and metaphysical distinction clear. Unlike the two Buddhist schools he accepts the relative reality of the world. He neither establishes nor demolishes the question of creation. He accepts it as it is but the ultimate inquiry, he says, is beyond human reason. It is, therefore, wise to realize the Brahman, the fountain-head of all mystical and metaphysical goal, where the question of dualism or causation is *māyā*. It is no use indulging in aimless speculation. He observes:—

अतीतकौटिरहितस्य संसारस्यान्तवत्त्वं समाप्तिर्न सेष्यति युक्तिः ।

मां. का. भा. 4. 30.

In his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (2. 4. 11) he gives the dissolution of the external world as “विषयस्य प्रलयक्रमः”

and then proceeds to do the same in the case of the subjective one as, “ब्रह्मविदां आत्यन्तिको बुद्धिपूर्वकः”. This could not have been possible had he not taken the internal as well as external worlds to be relatively real. His words are clear and definite. In spite of all these evidences if the theists were to persist in levelling the charge, it is not the fault of the Advaita as it is not the fault of a post if a blind man gets his head knocked down against it. His systematic and eclectic genius has made him embrace all the lower ideals and aspirations according to necessity and sincerity before realizing the Vedāntic consummation. It is just now shown that “भक्ति” is accepted by him as a step prior to “ज्ञान”. He goes a step further and accepts Vedic ritualism as the first step in religious life before one has devotion. It should be observed disinterestedly. He speaks of this thus,

एवं कर्मकाण्डेनास्यैकवाक्यतावगतिः । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 4. 4. 22.

अग्निहोत्रादीनां च वैदिकानां कर्मणां अर्थवत्वात् । छां. उ. भा. 6. 11. 3.

Side by side with this he advises moral virtues in *Br. Sūtra* Com., 3. 4. 26-27. He is also aware of the fact that there are many who do not take religion seriously. They are satisfied with give-and-take ethics. They may direct Vedic ritualism to that purpose to fulfil their various worldly expectations. He says,

प्रायेण हि पुरुषाः कामबहुलाः । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 4. 5. 15.

Thus they can be active and obliging members in society. Śankara takes into consideration the diversity of human nature and has meted out religious ideals to that effect. The following quotation makes this point clear:—

तस्मात्पुरुषमतिवैचित्र्यमपेक्ष्य साध्यसाधनसंबन्धविशेषानेन कथा उपदिशति

(शास्त्रम्) ।

बृ. आ. उ. भा. 2. 1. 20.

Even in the case of asceticism or *संन्यास* his views are worth noting. He leaves to aspirant's sincerity, earnestness and ability to bear the burden of the rigid view. He observes,

तस्मात्पुरुषसामर्थ्यज्ञानवैराग्यकामाद्यपेक्षया व्युत्थानविकल्पक्रमपरित्राज्यप्रतिपत्ति-

प्रकारा न विरुध्यन्ते । बृ. आ. उ. भा. 4. 5. 15.

He does not enforce it on all alike. Whenever he attacks the “ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवाद” he means that it cannot be reconciled with the highest mystical experience in Samādhi. In his *Chhândogya* Com. (2. 31. 1) he gives the meaning of “नैष्कर्म्य” according to his view and compares it with those of others. The question of quietism or activism is of different values. Activism is alright for socio-political and such other affairs in life. But the highest mystical and metaphysical goal is perfect tranquillity and grand serenity. If we examine all the passages in his Com. on the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (2. 10 and 21 ; 3 Intro. ; 3. 20 ; 4. 15 ; 4. 18-24 ; 5. 1 Intro. ; and 18. 66) we find that he strongly combats the view that rituals are necessary when one has realized the highest goal. To reach this stage, he says, actions either spiritual such as ritualistic performed disinterestedly or secular such as charitable and social are absolutely necessary. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* Com. (3. 27 and 2. 46) he maintains that,

कर्माणि लौकिकानि शास्त्रीयाणि ; and तस्मात्प्राज्ञाननिष्ठाधिकारप्राप्ते
 कर्मणि अधिकृतेन कूपतडागादि-अर्थस्थानीयमपि कर्म कर्तव्यम् ।

A liberated soul may work to set an example or for the spiritual good of humanity. But its activity is not “कर्म” in the technical sense ; because it has lost all the force of attachment though outwardly to the ignorant it might appear to possess it. In spite of all this it is not bound to undertake any activity ; because it is beyond any interdependent obligation, self-aggrandising motives, and idealized human interest. This should not be stamped with the stigma of pious indolence. Śankara has clearly stated this in his *Chhândogya* Com. (2. 23. 1 ; 3. 6. 2),

यच्चज्ञैरलसतया अकर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमः सोऽप्यसत् कारकबुद्धेः अनिवर्तित्वा-
 त्प्रमाणेन । and न ह्यनुत्साहवतां अननुतिष्ठतां अलसानां भोगप्राप्तिः
 लोके दृष्टा ।

Man can serve humanity not only physically and mentally but spiritually as well. In the third case he transcends both indolence and activity. Milton rightly remarks that, “They also serve who only stand and wait.” These are three different

standards of values. Śankara never disturbs them. His comprehensive and all-embracing outlook can be seen when we read his *Brhadāranyaka* (2. 1. 20) and *Bhagavad-Gītā* (13. 2) commentaries. He never asks to unsettle anybody. Let one stand where one desires and deserves. From there let one follow the ideal which suits one. Śankara has given the ladder of religious evolution ascending the steps of which in the proper manner one can reach the highest ideal. He greets all according to their sincerity. He rejects none. He is a practical idealist. He is not prepared to make the highest ideal popular. He is fully aware of the line, “सर्वस्य सर्वं न प्रियं हितं वा”. He says that there may be some exceptional people, who can realize the highest ideal without any external help (*Tai. Up. Com.* 1. 11, *Br. Sut. Com.* 3. 4. 38). In the case of the majority, cultural and socio-religious conventions are of great importance. He is, therefore, not merely ascetical and other-worldly. His conception of “धर्म” includes social well-being also. This is in his *Bh.-Gītā Com.* 4. 7 and 4. 1 where he says,

“धर्मस्य हि वर्णाश्रमादि लक्षणस्य प्राणिनामभ्युद्यनिश्रेयससाधनस्य ।”

“ब्रह्मक्षेत्रे परिपालिते जगत्परिपालयितुमलम् ।”

To safeguard the double interest, he believes not only in soul force but in martial force also. We have dealt with this outlook of Vedicism in life and religion while comparing it with that of Buddha. Śankara has faithfully and properly interpreted it without dragging it down to lower and mere utilitarian purposes. In spite of all this if one were to call him a hidden Buddhist it is simply betraying one's prejudice against him. It means that, “Prejudice prevails where judgment is lacking.”

III

Since the introduction of modern research and comparative study a new outlook is coming into existence. The methods and arguments of this study are fine and fascinating. It takes into account the historical evolution of religion and philosophy. It lays emphasis on induction and generalization.

It has infused a new spirit into chronology. This new critical method has demolished many a chronological absurdity. Rightly has it shown that by neglecting the question of time and authorship, orthodox scholarship has created a chronological chaos. These things, though culturally unimportant, have some value for the sake of historical accuracy. It has made men think before they accept anything. Blind and superstitious faith is blown away. Thus far we can take it as our guide. But when it goes a step further and tries to enter boldly and presumptuously into regions which are foreign to its activities, it is necessary to be free from its alluring airs and to expose its worthlessness and shortcomings. Its main defect is that, as yet, it is not convinced of the fact that behind the historical vicissitudes, in religion and philosophy, there is the under-current of culture ever present. The personality of modern critics often gives a different colouring to facts. This fact is noted by Oswald Spengler in his *Decline of the West*, where he observes, "... present-day historians ... believe themselves to have already grasped History, the happening, the becoming self. This is a prejudice common to all who proceed by reason and cognition as against intuitive perception" (Vol. I, Intro. p. 48). He further observes, "But, even to-day, it is only forms of it that we know and not *the* form of it, which is the mirror image of our own inner life" (*ibid.*, Intro. p. 16). According to the exigency of time different elements in religion may predominate as far as their external or social application is concerned. But the main thought is always there. If this is not borne in mind, mere historical study means nothing more than putting together disconnected pieces. There may be great art but there would be no heart. Mere superficial observation and cataloguing are neither here nor there. Orthodox scholarship treats of being without becoming; while this scholarship speaks of becoming without being. Both are partial and imperfect. Again with the help of its petrified outlook this scholarship dissects different scriptures in the world to pieces and tries to allot different periods for their composition. Thus it tries to trace the

origin, growth and development of a particular religion. What does not stand to its test is declared as an interpolation. We do not absolutely deny the possibility of interpolations. But it makes one suspect the motive and sincerity of this scholarship when they are intentionally invented. With the help of its present attempts if it tries to maintain that religious growth is necessarily chronological we have to assert that it is in the infancy of its activities and achievements. Even in the Vedic period there were men as highly advanced in spirituality as Śankara and Buddha. The question of the first beginning is unknown to Indian culture. It believes that every evolution is followed by involution and *vice versa*. The whole current of religious life may run, at times, smoothly and silently due to its influence and popularity or, at times, with vigorous self-expression and pristine purity due to the opposition from other contending forces or several corroding and disintegrating factors, that are acting against it on account of its being misrepresented in the hands of its later followers, wanting in sincerity and steadfast loyalty to the ideal aimed at. But the dynamic self-expression and reassertion of it in the hands of any illustrious and towering personality is not a sudden appearance without any connecting link or continued historicity. Intuitive experience takes its stand on the Highest Ideal and systematises all the other aspects as the different stages leading to "It". They are true for all times and climes. In the absence of this inner and deeper understanding the so-called historical criticism at the best can be a mere patchwork of meaningless jargon and learned uncertainty. The author of *Vākyapadiya* says the same thing in the following lines :—

हस्तस्पर्शादिबाधेन विषमेऽप्यभिधावता ।

अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥ 1. 42.

It is true that this scholarship made men think. But it does not seem to hold that in matters that transcend thought mere thinking stops short of its boasted claims. With the help of keen reasoning it has knocked down faith. But it has not substituted in its place anything that can give permanent.

satisfaction, solace, and salvation. In its comparative zeal this scholarship is often satisfied with apparent similarities and external data. As in the West so here in India it understands that different philosophical views are cold logical dogmas shorn off from their spiritual and ethical implications. But the moment they call their interpretations purely logical their spiritual claims are gone, because logic can never lead one to definite results in spirituality as the following line remarks:—तर्के नैवास्ति निश्चयः । Its realization gives the greatest reward that surpasses all strength and joy. It means that knowledge is power. Śankara in his commentary on the *Kenopaniṣad* (2. 4) says:—

स्वेन रूपेण लभते सामर्थ्यं, धनसहायमंत्रौषधितपोयोगकृतं वीर्यं मृत्युं न

शक्नोत्यभिभवितुं ।

On this ideal depend many questions of vital importance. It is the standard of religious values that justifies the relative merits of any philosophical system in India. Logically no system can be perfect or faultless. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākya-pāṭya* says to the same effect thus:—

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यै रन्यथैवोपपद्यते ॥ 1. 34.

It is not, therefore, unnatural if the followers of orthodox commentators look upon these modern authorities as utterly hopeless and unreliable guides in their field. Śaṅkara says the same thing thus:—

असंप्रदायवित्सर्वशास्त्रविदपि मूर्खवदेव उपेक्षणीयः । भ. गी. भा. 13. 2.

There is the other line of orthodox commentators who systematise the different stages of spiritual progress and bring out the Highest Ideal more clearly. All the previous stages, they say, are different steps leading to it. They sort the different passages of the *Upaniṣads*, *Brahma Sūtras* and *Bhagavad-Gītā* and interpret them so as to make these stages of realization clear. These stages cannot be called inconsistent or absurd; because experience justifies them. Mystics demonstrate them. These commentators say that consistency is true

as far as thought is concerned and maintain that all the systems of philosophy in India, either Vedic or semi-Vedic, do not take their stand purely on discursive reason. They take the help of logic to make their mystical or metaphysical position intelligible as Śāṅkara observes:—

वेदान्तार्थतत्त्वमेकत्वदर्शनं प्रत्यादरवन्तो मुमुक्षवः स्युरिति किञ्चिदुच्यतेऽस्माभिः,
नतु तार्किकवत्तात्पर्येण । प्र. उ. भा. 6. 3.

He strictly follows this other line of commentators. Modern scholars should better take the orthodox commentators as their guides in cultural questions if they are spiritually serious and not indulging in intellectual pastime. In this connection we quote the words of M. Paul Masson Orsel, an eminent French Orientalist of reputation who read his paper, "What Contemporary Europe can learn from India?", in French at a meeting of the Schopenhaur Society in Germany.

"Again our historical method which Indians learn from us because it tends to reveal to them their own past, also often appears, in many directions, in discord with the principles of India. Sometimes summary and sometimes hypercritical our method often judges the East on the basis of Western standards and estimates the past on the basis of the present. Too often this method slights the historical element in traditions, because it was considered by us as a war engine against tradition. Too often it projects our peculiar obsession and pseudo-scientific postulates into other milieus. Thus, because we are convinced that things are in a state of evolution, we shut our eyes to the relative fixity of Eastern Societies, and we wish that questions of chronology may have as much importance in Asia, as in the last few centuries in the West. Owing to our indifference to religious values, we appraise only the linguistic significance of religious texts, and hence we reach but the letter and not the spirit. India does not excuse for this fault, which is all the more serious in her eyes because we appear to boast of knowing India better than Indians themselves."*

* *Prabuddha-Bhārata*, p. 36, Jan. 1930.

For the purpose of this paper we have relied on Śankara's genuine works, viz., his commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, *Bhagavad-Gita* and ten principal Upaniṣads and *Upadeśasāhasri*. It is not possible to say anything definitely about the other works included in the Vani Vilas Memorial Edition. As regards his *Vākya*-commentary on the *Kenopaniṣad* we have our serious doubts although Ānandagiri has ascribed it to him. On the passage “उपनिषद्ब्राह्मी (के. उ. 4. 7)” Śankara in his *Pada-Bhāṣya* says, “ब्राह्मी ब्रह्मणः परमात्मनः इयं तां”. This is quite in keeping with the context. But the *Vākya-Bhāṣya* remarks “ब्रह्मणो ब्राह्मणजातेरुपनिषदम्”. This interpretation has nothing to do with the context. One of the commentators, who preceded Śankara, while commenting on “अथाऽतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा” (ब्र. सू. 1. 1. 1.) gave such an interpretation. But Padmapāda in his *Panchapadikā* rejected this as absurd in the following lines:—

तत्र यदन्यैर्वृत्तिकारैः ब्रह्मशब्दस्यार्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य निरम्यते,

न खलु ब्राह्मणजातिरिह गृह्यते प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् जिज्ञास्यत्वाभावात् । P. 64.

When Padmapāda in the presence of Śankara discarded this interpretation, it is unnatural to expect that Śankara should accept it in the *Vākya-Bhāṣya*. Śankara also rejects this irrelevant explanation thus:—

अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम् । ब्र. सू. भा. 1. 1. 1. It, therefore, follows that the *Pada-Bhāṣya* is his genuine work and the *Vākya-Bhāṣya* is from the pen of somebody else.

We have exhausted all the available information on this subject, and we hope that critics and scholars will throw fresh light on this subject.

The heading of this article is suggested by five articles, viz., गौडपाद बौद्ध हताके ? (गुजराती दिवाळी अंक 1925), The Māyāvāda (*Jn. of the Department of Letters*, Vol. XIX, 1929, pp. 76-78, Cal. Uni.), the “Schools of Vedānta” (pp. 30-40, the वसन्त रजत स्मारक अंक), “Vedānta Vindicated”, Trichinopoly (*Q.J.M.S.*, Vol. XXII, p. 497). But they have not treated the subject in full details. Hence this attempt to treat this subject systematically and exhaustively.